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Abstract
This paper develops a search and matching model with heterogeneous firms, on-the-job
search by workers, Nash bargaining over wages and adaptive learning. We assume that
workers are boundedly rational in the sense that they do not have perfect foresight about the
outcome of wage bargaining. Instead workers use a recursive OLS learning mechanism and
base their forecasts on the linear wage regression with the firm’s productivity and worker’s
current wage as regressors. For a restricted set of parameters we show analytically that the
Nash bargaining solution in this setting is unique. We embed this solution into the agent-
based simulation and provide a numerical characterization of the Restricted Perceptions
Equilibrium. The simulation allows us to collect data on productivities and wages which is
used for updating workers’ expectations. The estimated regression coefficient on productivity
is always higher than the bargaining power of workers, but the difference between the two
is decreasing as the bargaining power becomes larger and vanishes when workers are paid
their full productivity. In the equilibrium a higher bargaining power is associated with
higher wages and larger wage dispersion, in addition, the earnings distribution becomes
more skewed. Moreover, our results indicate that a higher bargaining power is associated
with a lower overall frequency of job-to-job transitions and a lower fraction of inefficient
transitions among them. Our results are robust to the shifts of the productivity distribution.
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1 Introduction
Classical search and matching studies often view the matching function as a ”black box” meaning
that neither workers nor firms are fully informed about the underlying matching process. In
contrast, most studies make an assumption that workers can perfectly foresee the outcomes of
future wage negotiations with heterogeneous employers. In a setting with job-to-job mobility and
bargained wages this framework requires extreme assumptions concerning workers’ knowledge
and computing abilities, moreover, it renders the model analytically intractable. Several studies
have modified the framework by allowing for permanent wage renegotiations and counteroffers
among competing employers to arrive at the analytical solution1. Even though it is a realistic
assumption for academic positions and senior management jobs, counteroffers from competing
employers are rare in many other professions and occupations. In this paper we follow a different
approach by considering boundedly rational workers and model the bargaining process as a
”black box” meaning that workers have limited foresight and can not perfectly predict the
outcome of wage bargaining. In particular, we follow the approach summarized in Hommes
(2013) and Evans and Honkapohja (2001) and characterize a Restricted Perceptions Equilibrium
where workers use adaptive learning mechanisms and base their forecasts on time series data.
Thus workers in our model behave as economic statisticians and update their beliefs over time
as new data becomes available. In the steady state some workers are overoptimistic about their
situation and disappointed by the low wage. Other workers are pessimistic in the beginning and
positively surprised by the successful outcome of bargaining. Nevertheless, the expectations of
workers are ”self-confirming” in the equilibrium in the sense that the data that workers observe
lead them to take actions that reproduce the data they observe.
More specifically, we assume that workers are forward-looking and form linear expectations
about future wages. Thus workers correctly expect to bargain a higher wage if matched with
a more productive employer. Also workers with higher current wages correctly anticipate to
bargain a higher wage with a new employer. Nevertheless, workers can not perfectly foresee the
non-linearity of the Nash bargaining process and form their expectations based on the estimated
linear regression with the employer’s productivity and worker’s current wage as regressors. The
estimated regression coefficients are based on aggregate statistical data up to the current period
of time. Inline with some empirical evidence (e.g. Gaffeo et al. (2003)) we assume that the
distribution of firm types has decreasing density, moreover, firms always bargain over the wage
with new employees but don’t renegotiate wages after the contract is signed. In this setting we
are able to derive the analytical expressions for the value functions of workers and firms, this
yields an implicit analytical solution for the Nash bargaining problem. For a restricted set of
parameters, we can show that the bargaining solution is unique and the actual wage is increasing
in the employer’s productivity and the current wage of the worker. We show numerically that
these properties hold for a wider range of parameters.
Further, we embed the analytical Nash bargaining solution in the agent-based simulation
of the labour market. The agent-based simulation approach is widely used for the analysis of
learning mechanisms in dynamic models especially in settings with heterogeneous agents and
complex interactions between them. For a summary see Neugart and Richiardi (2018), Dawid
1Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002a, 2002b), Cahuc et al. (2006)
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and Delli Gatti (2018) and Delli Gatti et al. (2018). To the best of our knowledge it was
not used so far for the analysis of workers’ expectation formation in the labour market with
search frictions, even though the advantages of this approach for the analysis of labour markets
have been emphasized by Freeman already in 1998. More specifically, we use the simulation to
record workers’ transitions across different employers and record their wages and productivities.
This statistical data base is used by workers in every period of time to form and update their
wage expectations. Comparing expected and actual wages in the steady state we can show that
workers are positively or negatively surprised by the bargained wage but the overall quality of
forecasting is very high and it is increasing in the bargaining power of workers. The reason is
that even though the actual bargained wage is not linear in productivity and the current wage,
its curvature in both variables is relatively low. The slope coefficient on productivity in the linear
regression is always higher than the bargaining power parameter, but the difference between the
two is decreasing with the bargaining power and falls down to zero when workers are paid their
full productivity. This is the limiting case when workers’ expectations are rational.
Considering the key macroeconomic properties of the model, we can show that the steady-
state wage distribution is unimodal and positively skewed inline with the empirical evidence2.
Even though we assume that firm types/productivities have decreasing density, workers move up
in the productivity ladder by changing employers. However, climbing the ladder becomes more
difficult the higher the wage of the worker, since productivity realizations above the current wage
become more and more scarce. Thus the majority of workers climbs quickly to the middle range
of the wage distribution where the speed of climbing slows down. Further, we can show that the
average wage in the steady-state is increasing in the bargaining power of workers and there is
a gradual shift towards the analytical wage distribution in the limiting case when workers are
paid their full productivity. At the same time wages become more dispersed and the positive
skewness of the wage distribution becomes stronger with a higher bargaining power.
One of the most important properties of our model is that it allows to evaluate the extent of
inefficient transitions. Even though workers’ job changes are always efficient from the individual
perspective as workers only change the job if they get a higher wage, some transitions are
socially inefficient since workers are moving from more productive employers to less productive
ones. Intuitively, for any interior bargaining power there is a gap between the output produced
by the worker and his/her wage. If the new employer’s productivity falls within this gap a
socially inefficient transition takes place. Our results indicate that a higher bargaining power of
workers is associated with a lower overall frequency of job-to-job transitions and a lower fraction
of inefficient transitions among them. This sheds some light on the lower job-to-job mobility
of workers in countries with strong unionization, like France and Germany, and more intensive
job-to-job mobility in countries with weak unions, like the US and UK, reported in Jolivet et al.
(2006). There is only one other study that investigated the extent of inefficient transitions, this
is Flinn et al. (2017). However, their model requires a simultaneous presence of firms with two
different wage strategies – those who post and never negotiate over wages and those who always
negotiate and match outside offers. In this respect our setting is less restrictive since inefficient
transitions take place even if all firms follow the same strategy.
Finally, we show that our results are robust to the shifts of the productivity distribution.
2Neal and Rosen (2000), Mortensen (2003) and Christensen et al. (2005)
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In particular, we find that the coefficients of the linear regression used in shaping workers’
expectations do not change if the average productivity of firms is increased or reduced. This
change has a nominal character, so the relative properties of the model, such as the frequency of
job-to-job transitions, the fraction of inefficient transitions and the slope of the wage regression
don’t change. Even though this finding is not straightforward it is consistent with the result by
Hornstein et al. (2011). This study reports that the ratio between the mean and the minimum
wage as well as the fraction of job-to-job movers in the standard on-the-job search model by
Burdett and Mortensen (1998) doesn’t depend on the shape of the wage offer distribution.
1.1 Literature Review
Empirical studies show that job-to-job transitions and wage bargaining are important features
of labour markets. Nagypal (2008) documents that almost 50% of all job separations in the US
are explained by job-to-job transitions. Hall and Krueger (2008) find that both wage posting
and bilateral wage bargaining are equally important in the American labour market. Their
survey data shows that the wage is determined by posting for 25 to 35% of workers, while it is
determined by wage bargaining for around 34% of workers. Moreover, while wage posting is more
common for lower educated workers and government jobs, wage bargaining is more common for
more educated and professional workers.
Another empirical study is conducted by Jolivet et al. (2006). They use panel data for indi-
viduals covering 10 European countries and the USA. Both job-to-job and job-to-unemployment
transition rates vary across countries. Whereas the fraction of job-to-job movers is relatively
low in Italy (5.7%), France (6.5%) and Belgium (6.8%), it is high in Ireland (16.5%), Denmark
(20%) and the UK (24.9%). Note that these numbers are reported over a three-year period.
More than 50% of job-to-job transitions are associated with a wage increase in all countries even
though there are also transitions with wage cuts.
In the past decades this empirical evidence was incorporated in the theoretical models of
frictional labour markets. The seminal study providing a detailed characterization of wage
ladders and job-to-job mobility is Burdett and Mortensen (1998) who developed a canonical
on-the-job search model with homogenous workers and firms, where the wage is determined by a
wage-posting game. Mortensen (2003) extended this model with Nash bargaining over wages. In
particular, he compared two wage determinations, namely posting and bilateral bargaining where
productivity heterogeneity over firms and endogenous recruiting effort is embodied. As a result,
he concludes that bilateral bargaining wage determination can replicate Danish wage distribution
and firm sizes, while wage posting hypothesis is not consistent with Danish data. One crucial
assumption underlying the model is that the outside opportunity of bargaining workers is always
unemployment irrespective of the worker’s current wage. Pissarides (2000) and Flinn (2010) have
extended the canonical on-the-job search model to account for firm heterogeneity but they keep
the same restrictive assumption that the outside option of workers in the bargaining process is
unemployment. Intuitively, this means that an unemployed individual and someone employed
at a high wage will bargain the same new wage if matched with identical firms.
Another approach developed by Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002a, 2002b) proposes a new
on-the-job search model in which heterogeneous employers are allowed to respond to workers
outside offers. Hence there is a Bertrand competition among firms in order to hire a worker.
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When a worker receives an outside offer his/her current employer can make a counteroffer,
so the worker will either enjoy a wage increase and stay or move to the new employer. This
idea is further extended by Cahuc et al. (2006). They consider strategic wage bargaining
between the incumbent and the poaching employer. The wage bargaining process is borrowed
from Rubinstein (1982), infinite-horizon alternating-offers bargaining game. Another study by
Gautier et al. (2010) investigates on-the-job search model with heterogeneous match qualities.
Thus in their model workers are moving from less productive jobs to more productive jobs. They
compare two wage setting regimes, one is wage posting where firms announce wages and commit
to paying these wages, another one is Nash bargaining over wages. Here again the outside option
of workers is assumed to be the state of unemployment.
Despite these numerous attempts to model on-the-job search, bilateral wage bargaining and
heterogeneous firms in a unified framework, existing research is based on a number of restrictive
assumptions. Some of the reviewed studies assume that the outside option of bargaining workers
is always unemployment irrespective of their current wage position. Other studies consider coun-
teroffers and Bertrand competition between the current and the new employer. Even though it
is a realistic assumption for academic labour markets and top management positions in indus-
trial companies it is rather rare in many other professions and occupations. Thus in this study
we consider firms that negotiate over wages in the beginning of the employment relationship
but don’t match outside offers of other firms. Moreover, we explicitly take into account that
workers employed at higher wages have a stronger bargaining position than unemployed workers.
Note that implementing this approach in a setting with rational expectations of workers requires
extreme assumptions concerning workers’ knowledge and computing abilities, moreover, it ren-
ders the model analytically intractable. Thus we follow the approach summarized in Hommes
(2013), Evans and Honkapohja (2001) and consider boundedly rational workers who use adaptive
learning mechanisms and base their forecasts on time series data.
In general, the expectation formation plays an important role in economic models. The reason
being that agents’ current expectations affect the actual outcomes, and the actual outcomes affect
their expectations in the next period (Hommes 2013). In the search and matching framework the
focus of earlier studies was on expectation formation in the presence of asymmetric information
and learning. For example, Jovanovic (1979) and Mortensen (1986) consider a setting where
workers searching for jobs are not fully informed about the distribution of productivities. In
this situation ”the worker acts as a Bayesian forecaster by using observations to date to make
predictions concerning the job’s true but unknown characteristics. As new information arrives,
the forecast is revised...” (Mortensen (1986), p. 877). In particular, both models assume that
the productivity distribution is normal with unknown mean but known variance. So it is the
average productivity that workers learn over time based on statistical data.
In the more recent search literature the focus is on group learning and peer pressure in the
process of expectation formation. For example, Horvath (2015) develops a search model with
wage bargaining to analyze the impact of social segregation on the wage gap between Black
and White workers. The two worker groups have different social networks transmitting different
social norms. The peer group of Black people transmits information that being unemployed is
common as there are relatively many unemployed people in the social networks of Black workers.
This gives rise to different expectations and different equilibrium outcomes of the two worker
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groups. In a similar vein Rotemberg (2017) shows that heterogeneous expectations of identical
workers can lead to different wages. He considers a non-stationary wage offer distribution, such
that wage offers are always low in the first time period, but can be high or low thereafter.
There are two groups of workers: those with accurate information and group-learners who are
not aware of the non-stationary of the wage offer distribution. Whereas the first group has a
high reservation wage and a higher average wage in the equilibrium, the second group has low
reservation wages and low equilibrium outcomes. The reason is that group learners observe low
wages in their social network, which reduces their reservation wage and makes them accept low
wage realizations in the first period. In sum both studies show that social norm or different
beliefs among equally productive workers generated by segregated social networks may result in
different wages. Earlier studies showing adverse effects of social networks on wages in a setting
with bargaining and on-the-job search include Zaharieva (2013, 2015).
Further our study is related to the literature on learning mechanisms which can be divided
into two strands. The first strand of literature shows that there are learning mechanisms such
that model outcomes can asymptotically converge to the rational expectation outcomes. The
second strand of literature emphasizes that convergence to the rational expectations outcomes
is not guaranteed. Rather the model with learning may exhibit a complicated and different path
than the rational expectation equilibrium.
The first group of studies includes Fourgeaud et al. (1986), Marcet and Sargent (1989), Bray
and Savin (1986), Evans and Honkapohja (1994, 1995, 2001), Tuinstra and Wagener (2007),
Marcet and Nicolini (2003), Bo¨hm and Wenzelburger (1999) etc. An earlier study by Fourgeaud
et al. (1986) provides the necessary and sufficient condition for the convergence and analyt-
ical proof for that in the model of Muth (1961). Basically the condition turns out that the
coefficient of expectation is less than one. Marcet and Sargent (1989) consider general recur-
sive linear models in which agents have limited access to the information and they are divided
into differently informed two groups. Agents form expectations through recursive least square
methods and update their parameters over time which is similar to our model. Under several
technical assumptions they provide necessary and sufficient conditions for convergence to the
rational equilibrium outcomes. Bray and Savin (1986) investigates the stability of the ratio-
nal expectations equilibrium for linear version of Cobweb model with exogenous demand shock
under the ordinary least squares (OLS) and Bayesian learning mechanisms. Firms form expec-
tation about future price and decide their output level based on their expectations. Firms learn
the parameters using these two linear regressions. They show that the estimated parameters
converge to the rational expectation equilibria and are stable under the similar condition with
Fourgeaud et al (1986). Tuinstra and Wagener (2007) and Marcet and Nicolini (2003) have
used the OLS learning mechanism to forecast inflation in macroeconomic models. The second
group of studies emphasizes the point that convergence to the rational expectations equilibrium
depends on the learning mechanism and is not always guaranteed. For example, there can be
new chaotic equilibria as in Bullard (1994) and Scho¨nhofer (1999) such that the forecast errors
of agents never vanish.
Hommes and Sorger (1998) introduce the notion of consistent expectation equilibria (CEE)
belonging to the class of restricted perception equilibria. They show existence and stability
of three types of equilibria in a Cobweb framework where the learning mechanism is sample
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autocorrelation (SAC) learning. CEE means that the sample average and the sample autocor-
relations generated by the actual (unknown) stochastic process coincide with the corresponding
statistics for the perceived linear process. This is similar in our model with recursive OLS learn-
ing since workers correctly perceive the correlation between productivities and wages without
fully understanding the actual bargaining process. So there is consistency between the agents
beliefs and the actual outcomes.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we explain the economic environment and derive
the value functions for workers. In section 3 we introduce linear wage expectation formation and
derive the value functions for firms. In the same section we analyze the theoretical outcome of
Nash bargaining over wages and illustrate our results with a numerical example. In section 4 we
introduce statistical learning and expectation updating in the agent-based simulation framework
and summarize our results. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
Time is continuous and workers are infinitely lived. The total population size is normalized to
1. Every worker can be employed e or unemployed u, so that e + u = 1. Unemployed workers
receive the flow unemployment benefit z. Job-offers arrive at the Poisson arrival rate λ, which
is the job-finding rate. Also employed workers receive job offers at rate λ. Upon the match
workers learn the match-specific productivity y, which is a random variable with a cumulative
distribution Q(y) and density q(y), z < y < y¯. This means that Q(z) = 0 and Q(y¯) = 1. Here y¯
is the highest productivity draw which can also be infinity. If the productivity y is higher than
the current flow income of the worker, which is z for the unemployed and w for the employed,
this worker and the employer bargain over the wage. The bargaining process will be described
later in the paper. The worker is changing the job if the new bargained wage is higher than the
current flow income (z or w). The option of waiting in this setting has zero value, since workers
don’t lose any opportunities by accepting jobs with a higher income. However, there can be
inefficient transitions when workers move from more productive employers to less productive
employers. This is due to the fact that there are no counter-offers of the current employer. So
firms bargain over wages in the beginning of the employment relationship but don’t renegotiate
thereafter. We simplify the model by assuming that firms exit the market and get zero value if
initial bargaining with the worker was not successful, thus firms always accept every worker as
long as the bargained wage w is below the productivity y. At rate δ any job can be destroyed
and the worker becomes unemployed.
Workers are forward-looking but have limited foresight in the sense that they can not perfectly
predict the outcomes of future bargaining. Let x = φ(y, w) be the expected future wage of the
worker (increasing in both arguments) who is currently earning a wage w, was searching on-the-
job and is matched with a new employer with productivity y ≥ w. Assume that φ(w,w) = w,
so if the new employer has productivity y = w, the worker expects to get the same wage w as
with a current employer. x = φ(y, w) also means that we can write y = φ−1(x,w). Unemployed
workers expect a future wage φ(y, z).
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2.1 Value functions
Let U be the present value of income in unemployment while W (w) be the present value of
employment at current wage w. The present value of unemployment U is given by:
rU = z + λ
∫ y¯
z
max[W (φ(y, z))− U, 0]dQ(y) = z + λ
∫ y¯
y0
(W (φ(y, z))− U)dQ(y) (1)
Unemployed workers receive the flow unemployment benefit z and get job offers at rate λ. The
integral reflects an expected gain from finding a job. Unemployed workers only accept jobs if
the present value of the new job W (φ(y, z)) is larger than the present value of unemployment U .
Let y0 be the reservation productivity of unemployed workers, defined as W (φ(y0, z)) = U . This
means that unemployed workers will not accept any job with productivity below y0. Further,
assume that the value function W (w) is increasing, so that W ′(w) > 0. This gives rise to the
second part of the above expression. We verify our assumption W ′(w) > 0 later in the paper.
Next consider the present value of employment at the current wage w:
rW (w) = w + λ
∫ y¯
z
max[(W (φ(y, w))−W (w)), 0]dQ(y)− δ(W (w)− U)
= w + λ
∫ y¯
w
(W (φ(y, w))−W (w))dQ(y)− δ(W (w)− U) (2)
This equation implies that employed workers are choosy and only accept jobs with a new present
value W (φ(y, w)) larger than the current present value W (w). Since φ(w,w) = w we know that
employed workers accept jobs with productivity y above their current wage w, which gives rise
to the second part of the above equation. At rate δ every worker may lose the job and becomes
unemployed.
Evaluating W (w) at wage w = φ(y0, z) and using that W (φ(y0, z)) = U we get:
rU = φ(y0, z) + λ
∫ y¯
φ(y0,z)
(W (φ(y, φ(y0, z)))− U)dQ(y) (3)
Comparing this equation with (1) we can see that y0 = z, so that unemployed workers always
accept all jobs, because their productivity y is larger than the reservation productivity y0 = z.
This finding is an extension of the result by Burdett and Mortensen (1998) and is summarized
in lemma 1:
Lemma 1 If workers are searching on-the-job and form expectations x = φ(y, w), where w
is the current wage and y ∼ Q(y), y ≥ z is the productivity of the employer giving rise to the
present values of (un)employment U and W (w), W ′(w) > 0, moreover, the job offer arrival rate
λ is the same in all states, φ(y, w) is increasing in both arguments and φ(w,w) = w, then the
reservation productivity y0, defined as W (φ(y0, z)) = U , is equal to the unemployment benefit z.
Proof: Taking difference between equations (3) and (1) we get:
z − φ(y0, z) = λ
∫ y¯
φ(y0,z)
(W (φ(y, φ(y0, z)))− U)dQ(y)− λ
∫ y¯
y0
(W (φ(y, z))− U)dQ(y)
Suppose that y0 > z, so that y0 = φ(y0, y0) > φ(y0, z) > φ(z, z) = z. The left-hand side of the
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above equation is strictly negative. Now consider the right-hand side, which can be written as:
λ
∫ y0
φ(y0,z)
(W (φ(y, φ(y0, z)))− U)dQ(y) + λ
∫ y¯
y0
(W (φ(y, φ(y0, z)))−W (φ(y, z)))dQ(y)
Note that W (φ(φ(y0, z), φ(y0, z))) = W (φ(y0, z)) = U . Since W (w) is increasing, we know that
W (φ(y, φ(y0, z))) > U for y > φ(y0, z), so the first term of the above expression is strictly
positive. Concerning the second term we know that φ(y, φ(y0, z)) > φ(y, φ(z, z)) = φ(y, z),
which means that W (φ(y, φ(y0, z))) −W (φ(y, z)) > 0 if W (w) is increasing in w. This proves
that the right-hand-side of the above expression is strictly positive. So y0 > z can not be a
solution. In a similar way, one can show that y0 < z can not be a solution because the left-hand
side is than strictly positive, while the right-hand side is strictly negative. So there exists a
unique solution y0 = z because φ(z, z) = z and φ(y, φ(z, z)) = φ(y, z). 
Lemma 1 shows that the standard result of Burdett and Mortensen (1998) that unemployed
workers searching on-the-job don’t reject any job offers with a wage above the unemployment
benefit as long as the job-finding rate is the same in all states, extends to our setting. This is
intuitive because unemployed workers don’t lose any opportunities by following this strategy.
Further, rewrite the present value of employed workers W (w) (using integration by parts
and substituting y = φ−1(x,w), see appendix) as:
rW (w) = w + λ
∫ φ(y¯,w)
w
[1−Q(φ−1(x,w))]W ′(x)dx− δ(W (w)− U)
where φ−1(x,w) is the inverse function. Taking derivative of W (w) with respect to w and using
that Q(y¯) = 1 we obtain:
(r + δ + λ(1−Q(w)))W ′(w) = 1− λ
∫ φ(y¯,w)
w
q(φ−1(x,w))
∂φ−1(x,w)
∂w
W ′(x)dx
In the next section we use this equation and continue the analysis with a linear expectation
operator φ(y, w).
3 Linear wage expectation operator
Suppose workers use a linear wage expectation operator of the form x = φ(y, w) = αy+(1−α)w
with 0 < α ≤ 1, so the expected future wage is a weighted average between y and w. Even
though workers don’t have perfect foresight about the future, they expect that their future wage
will be higher with a higher productivity of the new employer y. Moreover, workers receiving
higher wages w expect to get a higher wage from a new employer due to the stronger position in
bargaining. This functional form satisfies our assumptions that φ(w,w) = w. In the following we
will consider the case when workers use past statistical data and estimate parameter α by means
of the restricted OLS estimator. The inverse function is then y = φ−1(x,w) = (x− (1−α)w)/α
for y ≥ x ≥ w.
In addition, to simplify the problem we consider an exponential distribution of productivities
Q(y) = 1 − e−γ(y−z) and q(y) = γe−γ(y−z). This is a shifted exponential distribution with the
lowest productivity equal to z and the average productivity equal to 1/γ. This distribution is
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inline with empirical findings about the decreasing density of the productivity distribution. For
example, Gaffeo et al (2003) use accounting data on sales, total capital and total loan capital of
firms and find decreasing densities of firm types with long right tails in all three cases. In the
end of the paper we perform a robustness check by varying parameter γ and show numerically
that our results do not depend on the shape of the productivity distribution. Given the above
assumptions we get:
rW (w) = w + λ
∫ ∞
w
e−γ
(x−(1−α)w−αz)
α W ′(x)dx− δ(W (w)− U) (4)
Differentiating this equation with respect to w we get:
(r + δ + λe−γ(w−z))W ′(w) = 1 +
λ(1− α)
α
∫ ∞
w
γe−γ
(x−(1−α)w−αz)
α W ′(x)dx
= 1 +
γ(1− α)
α
(rW (w)− w + δ(W (w)− U)) (5)
Let k ≡ r+δ to simplify the notation. Next consider a benchmark case α = 1, which corresponds
to the situation when workers expect to receive wages equal to the marginal productivity y.
Inserting α = 1 and W ′(w) = 1/(k + λe−γ(w−z)) into equation (4) we find the following value
function:
rW (w) = z +
1
γ
[ln (keγ(w−z) + λ)− ln k]− δ(W (w)− U)
Further, we estimate this function at w = z and use the definition of the reservation wage W (z) =
U to find the present value of unemployment U . This yields U = z/r+ (1/γr)[ln (k + λ)− ln k].
This expression shows that unemployed workers gain higher present value when the unemploy-
ment benefit z is higher, firms are more productive (lower γ) and finding jobs is easier (higher
λ). Finally, rearranging the terms we find the present value of employment W (w) (appendix II):
W (w) =
z
r
+
ln (keγ(w−z) + λ)− ln (k + λ)
γk
+
ln (k + λ)− ln k
γr
In the benchmark case α = 1 function W (w) is strictly increasing and convex in w:
W ′(w) =
eγw
(keγw + λ)
> 0 W ′′(w) =
γλeγw
(keγw + λ)2
> 0
Intuitively α = 1 means that workers always expect to get a wage w equal to their full produc-
tivity y. This expectation is rational, for example, when the bargaining power of workers β is
equal to 1. In all other cases when β < 1 and α < 1, we consider boundedly rational workers.
Thus we proceed with a more general case when 0 < α < 1. Equation (5) yields the following
first order linear differential equation for W (w):
W ′(w) =
α− γ(1− α)(w + δU)
α(k + λe−γ(w−z))
+
γ(1− α)k
α(k + λe−γ(w−z))
W (w) (6)
The general solution of this equation and its properties are summarized in proposition 1:
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Proposition 1:The general solution of the first order linear differential equation (6) is:
W˜ (w) = (keγ(w−z) + λ)
1−α
α
(∫ w
z
(α− γ(1− α)(x+ δU))
α(k + λe−γ(x−z))
(keγ(x−z) + λ)−
(1−α)
α dx+ C
)
Moreover, the present value of unemployment is given by U = (k+λ)
1−α
α C, where the integration
constant C can be found as:
rk
1−α
α C = z + λ
∫ ∞
z
e−γ
(w−z)
α A′(w)dw where
A(w) ≡ (keγ(w−z) + λ) 1−αα
∫ w
z
(α− γ(1− α)x)(keγ(x−z) + λ)− 1−αα
α(k + λe−γ(x−z))
dx
Proof: Appendix I
Proposition 1 yields a general solution of equation (6). However, for it to be a valid value
function we have to verify that W˜ (w) is an increasing function of w. In the following proposition
we present explicit analytical solutions in the three special cases with α = 1/2, α = 1/3 and
α = 1/4 and show that in these cases W˜ (w) is a strictly increasing function of w, therefore, it
is a valid value function.
Proposition 2: Consider a special case when the unemployment benefit z is zero.
a) For α = 1/2, the value functions of employed and unemployed workers W (w) and U are:
kW (w) = w + δU +
(keγw + λ)[ln (k + λe−γw)− ln k]
γλ
− 1
γ
rU =
(k + λ)
γ
[ ln (k + λ)− ln k
λ
− 1
k + λ
]
, W ′(w) > 0,W ′′(w) > 0
b) For α = 1/3, the value functions of employed and unemployed workers W (w) and U are:
kW (w) = w + δU +
(keγw + λ)2[ln (k + λe−γw)− ln k]
γλ2
− (ke
γw + λ)
γλ
− 1
2γ
rU =
(k + λ)2
γλ
[ ln (k + λ)− ln k
λ
− 1
k + λ
− λ
2(k + λ)2
]
, W ′(w) > 0,W ′′(w) > 0
c) For α = 1/4, the value functions of employed and unemployed workers W (w) and U are:
kW (w) = w + δU +
(keγw + λ)3[ln(k + λe−γw)− ln(k)]
γλ3
− (ke
γw + λ)2
γλ2
− ke
γw + λ
2γλ
− 1
3γ
rU =
(k + λ)3
γλ2
[ [ln(k + λ)− ln(k)]
λ
− 1
k + λ
− λ
2(k + λ)2
− λ
2
3(k + λ)3
]
, W ′(w) > 0,W ′′(w) > 0
Proof: Appendix II.
Recall that W (w) is increasing and convex in the benchmark case α = 1. Proposition 2
shows that even for lower values of α equal to 1/2, 1/3 and 1/4 this property holds and there
exists a valid value function W (w). Figure 1 plots W (w) and shows that the value function is
increasing and convex in w also for the intermediate values of α. Overall, we can see that more
optimistic beliefs of workers with higher values of α give rise to higher value functions. The
upper curve corresponds to the case α = 1 when workers expect to receive their full output:
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φ(y, w) = y. In the opposite case when α→ 0, the present values of employed and unemployed
workers become limα→0 U = 0 and limα→0W (w) = w/k since the unemployment benefit z is
normalized to zero and workers don’t expect anything better in the future than their current
flow income φ(y, w) = w. So the value function W (w) becomes linear in w when α→ 0.
Description Values
Job destruction rate δ = 0.05
Discount rate r = 0.01
Job offer rate λ = 0.45
Exponential intensity γ = 1
Unemployment benefit z = 0
Figure 1: Left panel: Value functions of workers for different parameters α. Right panel:
Benchmark parameter setting
To illustrate the value function we use parameters from the right table of figure 1. In
particular, we set one period of time to be one quarter and the annual discount rate equal to
4%. This implies a quarterly value of r = 0.01. The job destruction rate is set at δ = 0.05 and the
job offer rate is λ = 0.45. This leads to the steady state unemployment rate u = δ/(δ+λ) = 0.1,
that is 10%. The intensity parameter of the exponential distribution is set at γ = 1, so the
average productivity type is equal to 1. At the same time 63% of firms have productivity below
1. Note that the average productivity in the steady state will be higher than 1 since jobs
with more (less) productive employers are more (less) stable. These parameters will be used
throughout the study. Next we move to the analysis of firms’ profits and bargaining.
3.1 Profits of firms
In this section we take the perspective of firms and consider their profits. Let J(y, w) be the
present value of a filled job for the firm with productivity level y which pays the employed worker
wage w. The present value of a filled job J(y, w) is given by:
rJ(y, w) = (y − w)− δJ(y, w)− λ(1−Q(w))J(y, w)
Firms receive the flow profit (y − w) and may lose their workers if the job is destroyed at
rate δ or when workers quit with probability λ(1−Q(w)). Note here that workers quit whenever
they are matched with a new employer whose productivity is higher than the current wage of
the worker w. In some cases these quits can be socially inefficient since workers change from
more productive employers to less productive ones. This happens, for example, if w < y′′ < y,
where y′′ is the new employer’s productivity. In the opposite case when w < y < y′ workers
move to more productive employers with productivity y′and the transition is socially efficient.
This is illustrated on figure 2. The probability that w < y′ is given by (1−Q(w)).
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Figure 2: Workers’ transitions
The present value of a filled job can be rewritten as:
J(y, w) =
y − w
r + δ + λ(1−Q(w))
We can observe that a higher wage w has both a negative and a positive effect on firm’s
profit. On the one hand, the flow profit per unit of time in the numerator is lower with a higher
wage. But on the other hand, the quitting probability in the denominator is also lower with a
higher wage. This means that firms receive the profit over a longer period of time. Therefore,
the profit function can be hump-shaped. Next, consider the first order derivative of J(y, w) with
respect to w and use that k = r + δ and 1−Q(w) = e−γ(w−z):
J ′(y, w) =
(−1)(k + λe−γ(w−z)) + (y − w)λγe−γ(w−z)
(k + λe−γ(w−z))2
In order to find a wage that maximizes the present value of profits we set J ′(y, w) = 0, so
the first order condition becomes:
keγ(w−z) + λ = (y − w)λγ (7)
We can see that the left-hand side of this expression is strictly increasing in w starting at the
lowest value k + λ when w = z. In contrast, the right-hand side is a linear decreasing function
starting at the highest value (y − z)λγ. So there exists a unique solution of this equation
whenever k+λ < (y− z)λγ. Let this solution be denoted by w∗(y). Intuitively, this means that
the profit maximization problem has the corner solution whenever k+λ > (y− z)λγ. Otherwise
there exists a unique value w∗(y) which is maximizing the firm profit J(w, y). This results are
summarized in lemma 2:
Lemma 2: Let y∗ denote the productivity threshold which is given by y∗ = k+λλγ + z. Firms
with low productivity y < y∗ have a strictly decreasing profit function ∀w > z. For more
productive firms with y > y∗ there exists a unique profit maximizing wage w∗(y) > z given by
equation (7):
If y > y∗ ⇒
J ′(y, w) > 0, for w < w∗(y)J ′(y, w) < 0, for w > w∗(y)
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The profit function J(y, w) is concave, that is J ′′w(y, w) < 0, for w∗(y) < w < y.
Proof: Appendix III.
Intuitively lemma 2 means the following. Very unproductive firms with y < y∗ realize that they
can not compete with other firms for workers. If they had a full bargaining power over the
wage, they would choose the lowest wage w = z. This is different for more productive firms
with y > y∗. Conditional on having full bargaining power they would set a wage strictly above
z to reduce the probability of worker quitting. However, a situation when firms possess full
bargaining power is not realistic, so we continue with the analysis of Nash bargaining with an
interior bargaining weight in the next subsection.
3.2 Wage determination
Wages are determined by individual bargaining between the worker and the firm. Specifically,
we use the generalized Nash bargaining concept. Let w0 be the current wage of the worker and
0 < β < 1 be the workers’ bargaining power. We assume that the new employer is informed about
the current wage w0. If there is disagreement, the worker remains with the previous employer
and gets a present value of W (w0), while the firm exists the market with nothing. If negotiation
succeeds, then the joint productivity of the worker and the firm becomes y, the worker receives
the wage w with a present value W (w) and firm’s expected profit becomes J(y, w). Thus, the
Nash objective function can be written as:
w = arg max(W (w)−W (w0))βJ(y, w)1−β (8)
The bargaining solution w, maximizing the Nash objective function must satisfy the first-
order condition:
βJ(y, w)W ′(w) = −(1− β)(W (w)−W (w0))J ′w(y, w) (9)
If the bargaining power of workers is close to 1, this equation implies that workers set their
wage equal to the productivity y. In the opposite extreme case, when β = 0, this equation implies
that J ′w(y, w) = 0. We already know from the previous section that firms with productivity above
y∗ will want to set a profit maximizing wage w∗(y) as long as this wage is above the current wage
of the worker w0. This means max[w0, w
∗(y)] < w < y. In general note that any solution of the
above equation implies that J ′w(y, w) < 0, so that both sides of the equation are positive. This is
intuitive, because the outcome of negotiation should lie on the Pareto frontier where firms resist
further wage increases. A wage such that J ′w(y, w) > 0 can not be an outcome of the bargaining
problem since in this case both workers and firms will gain by negotiating a wage increase.
Let w(y, w0) denote solution of equation (9), that is the outcome of the bargaining process.
Even though in general we can not prove that this solution is unique for all parameter values, it
is possible for parameters described in proposition 2:
Lemma 3: Consider the following special cases α = 1/4, α = 1/3, α = 1/2 and α = 1 and
let the unemployment benefit z be normalized to zero. Then the Pareto frontier of the generalized
Nash bargaining problem (8) is decreasing and concave. Given that the Nash objective function
(8) implies a decreasing convex relation between W and J , the generalized Nash bargaining
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solution w(y, w0) is unique.
Proof: Lemma 2 shows that firms with low productivity (y < y∗) have a decreasing present
value of profits in the whole range [w0..y]. For more productive firms (y > y
∗) consider first the
case w0 < w
∗(y). It is clear that the range [w0..w∗(y)] is not Pareto optimal as both workers
and firms would agree on a higher wage. However, for w > w∗(y) we already know that the
profit function is decreasing. In the second case when w0 > w
∗(y) the profit function is again
decreasing in the whole range [w0..y]. So the feasible set of wages that satisfy Pareto optimality
is given by [max (w0, w
∗(y))..y]. The profit function J(w, y) is decreasing in w in this range,
while the workers’ value function W (w) is increasing and convex.
Let w(J, y) be the unique inverse function of J(w, y) in the range w ∈ [max (w0, w∗(y))..y].
The Pareto frontier is then given by W (w(J, y)). Differentiate W (w(J, y)) with respect to J :
∂W (w(J, y))
∂J
=
∂W
∂w(J, y)
· ∂w(J, y)
∂J
=
∂W
∂w(J, y)
· 1
∂J(w, y)/∂w
< 0
∂W 2(w(J, y))
∂J2
=
∂2W
∂w(J, y)2
· ∂w(J, y)
∂J
+
∂W
∂w(J, y)
· ∂
2w(J, y)
∂J2
=
∂2W
∂w(J, y)2
· 1
∂J(w, y)/∂w
− ∂W
∂w(J, y)
· ∂
2J
∂w(J, y)2
( 1
∂J(w, y)/∂w
)3
< 0
where in the last line we used the property of the inverse second order derivative and the fact
that ∂2J/∂w2 < 0 for w > w∗(y) (lemma 2). This proves that the Pareto frontier is decreasing
and concave. Further let us fix the Nash objective function to some constant level K. It is
straightforward to show that this function W = W (w0) +KJ
− (1−β)
β describes a negative convex
relationship between W and J . This completes the proof. 
This lemma shows that the Pareto frontier corresponding to wages w ∈ [max (w0, w∗(y))..y]
is a decreasing and concave function in the space [J,W ]. However, the Nash objective function
(W − W (w0))βJ1−β is decreasing and convex. So the tangency point which gives the Nash
bargaining solution w(w0, y) is unique. Note that the same is true in the reverse space [W,J ].
In the section with numerical results we show that this property holds more generally also for
other values of α.
Consider a special case when α = 1, so the modified first order condition can be written as:
β(y − w) = −(1− β) [ln(ke
γw + λ)− ln(keγw0 + λ)]
kγ
[
(y − w)λγe−γw − (k + λe−γw)
]
(10)
Even though we can not characterize a general function w(y, w0) for all parameter values,
lemma 4 summarizes our results for the special case α = 1.
Lemma 4: Consider a special case when α = 1 and z = 0. Then the unique solution of
the bargaining problem (8) is implicitly given by equation (10), moreover, the bargained wage
w(y, w0) is strictly increasing in both arguments:
∂w(y, w0)
∂y
> 0 and
∂w(y, w0)
∂w0
> 0
Proof: Appendix III.
This lemma shows that in the special case α = 1, bargained wages are increasing in the
productivity of the firm y and in the current wage of the worker w0. This means that two
15
workers may bargain different wages with the same employer if their pre-bargaining situation
was different. Note that we assume no possibility of waiting for firms. That is the firm exits the
market if the negotiation with the applicant was not successful. This is a simplifying assumption
of the model. In the opposite case, if firms could wait for another applicant, it is possible that
they would reject applicants with very strong bargaining positions implying very low profits for
the firm. Next we address a question whether the wage function has the same properties for a
wider range of α-s. Given that we can not prove it analytically, we proceed with the numerical
results in the next subsection.
3.3 Comparative statics
In this section we analyze numerically how the bargained wage depends on the characteristics of
workers and firms. We start by plotting the present value of profits J(y, w) for different values of
y and w on the left panel of figure 3. This figure illustrates that the profit maximization problem
has internal solution when the productivity level y is higher than the productivity threshold y∗
while there is a corner solution otherwise. Our choice of parameters is summarized in the table
on figure 1. These parameters imply that y∗ = 1.13, so that firms with productivity below 1.13
have strictly decreasing profit functions. The highest curve corresponds to the productivity level
y = 3.5. Only 3% of matches in our model have productivity above this level. Thus this figure
shows the profit functions for the majority of firms.
Figure 3: Left panel: Firms’ value functions for different productivities. Right panel: Nash
objective function for different values of K, w0 = 0.5, y = 3.5, α = 0.65, β = 0.5
On the right panel of figure 3 we illustrate the Pareto frontier (black solid curve) given by
J(y, w(W )) and several Nash objective functions given by (W −W (w0))βJ1−β = K. We can see
that the set of feasible combinations of J and W is convex, but the dashed part of the frontier is
not Pareto optimal. Inline with lemma 3 the Pareto frontier is concave, while the Nash objective
function is convex, which yields a unique tangency point. On the figure this point corresponds
to the optimal wage w = 2.50 generating an allocation [W = 185.6, J = 10.32, ] on the figure.
Note that the firm has productivity y = 3.5 and the current wage of the worker is w0 = 0.5. The
bargaining power β = 0.5, while the expectation coefficient α = 0.65. In the extreme case when
β = 1, the Nash objective function is represented by the vertical line, so the wage is equal to the
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productivity w = y = 3.5. In this case workers get their maximal value W = 199.2. In contrast,
when β = 0, the Nash objective function becomes horizontal, so firms set a wage w = 1.74, which
corresponds to the allocation [W = 177.13, J = 12.66, ] with the highest possible present value
of profits for firms. Overall, this figure shows that the Nash solution is unique in our setting
even though we can only prove it analytically for several selected values of α (see lemma 3).
On figure 4 we fix the productivity of firms y = 3.5 and analyze the implications of different
worker types and their expectations. In particular, on the left panel we increase the current wage
of the applicant w0 between 0.5 and 2. We can see again that in all cases there exists a unique
wage maximizing the Nash bargaining product and this wage is increasing in w0. Note that
firms with productivity y = 3.5 will always agree to pay at least a wage w∗(3.5) = 1.74, which
is maximizing their individual profit. This implies that all bargained wages are compressed in
the range [1.74...3.5].
Figure 4: Nash objective function for different values of w0 and α, β = 0.5, y = 3.5
On the right panel of figure 4 we present comparative statics with respect to α varying it
between 0.4 and 1. Workers are pessimistic for low values of alpha but they are optimistic
in the opposite case. For instance, when α = 0.4 the worker’s expected wage is equal to
0.4 ·3.5+(1−0.4) ·0.5 = 1.7 and the bargained wage is 2.51. Clearly, the worker underestimates
his/her actual wage. In contrast, for higher α, when α = 1 the worker’s expected wage is 3.5
and the bargained wage is 2.61, the worker overestimates the actual wage. Overall, we can see
that more optimistic workers with higher α-s bargain higher wages.
Finally on figure 5 we analyze the impact of productivities on wage. On the left panel we
illustrate the Nash objective function for different productivity levels y ranging between 2 and
3.5. We also use a bargaining power parameter β = 0.5, and the expectation coefficient α = 0.5.
The current wage of the worker is w0 = 0.5 for the purpose of this illustration. We can see
that for all considered productivities there exists a unique wage which is maximizing the Nash
objective function. Moreover, the bargained wages are increasing with y. The right panel plots
wages against productivities y and starting wages w0. We already know that bargained wages
are increasing in both arguments. This figure reveals additionally, that the wage w(y, w0) is a
convex function of both arguments. The lowest dashed curve corresponds to the situation when
unemployed (z = 0) workers bargain over wages, while upper curves show wages of employed
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Figure 5: Left panel: Nash objective function for different values of y, w0 = 0.5, β = 0.5,
α = 0.5. Right panel: Wage as a function of y and w0, β = 0.5, α = 0.65
workers changing employers. Moreover, this figure shows that negotiated wages are more sen-
sitive to the bargaining positions of workers (reflected in w0) when workers bargain with less
productive employers. So the variation in wages due to w0 is large (small) when workers are
matched with less (more) productive employers.
4 Simulation results
4.1 Statistical learning mechanism
Agent-based simulation is a common tool for the analysis of dynamics in complex systems. In
particular, agent-based models are based on the bottom up approach and allow to analyze the
interaction of heterogeneous agents according to some behavioral rules relaxing such assumptions
as rational expectations, perfect information and representative agents. Interestingly, one can
observe the emergence of macroeconomic outcomes through the microeconomic interaction of
many agents, moreover, agent-based models are able to reproduce stylized empirical facts in
labour economics and macroeconomics (Dosi et al. 2006). For instance, the stylized facts that
are often considered in labour economics include the matching function, the wage density and
the firm size distribution which have been shown to be highly skewed.
According to Neugart and Richiardi (2018) labour market agent-based models can be divided
into two categories: partial models and labour market models which are embedded in the agent-
based macroeconomic framework in various settings. The main results and features of these
models are discussed extensively in Neugart and Richiardi (2018) for the first category and in
Dawid and Delli Gatti (2018), in Delli Gatti et al (2018) for the second category respectively.
Many studies have been carried out recently in various scopes using partial models such as
Gemkow and Neugart (2011), Lewkovicz et al. (2009), Neugart (2004), Richiardi (2004, 2006)
and Ballot (2002). For example, Richiardi (2006) develops an on-the-job search model with
entrepreneurial decisions, endogenous wage determination and endogenous matching between
works and firms. The model relies on the assumption that wages are determined by a firm
specific constant fraction of the worker’s productivity. It is shown that the model is able to
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reproduce several important stylized facts such as the Beverage curve, the Okun curve, and
wage, income and firm size distributions. Our model is also conducted in the partial equilibrium
framework and the main purpose of the simulation is to collect data on workers’ transitions, their
wages and productivities. These data is used by workers to update their wage expectations.
In the previous section we have characterized the bargained wage function w(y, w0) assuming
that workers expect a wage φ(y, w0). In the equilibrium with rational expectations and perfect
foresight we would require that w(y, w0) = φ(y, w0) for all productivity realizations y and for
all previous wages w0. This means that workers know precisely the outcome of the bargaining
process with every possible employer. However, this condition requires extreme assumptions
concerning workers’ knowledge and computing abilities, moreover, it renders the model analyti-
cally intractable. For this reason we consider boundedly rational agents with limited foresight as
a more realistic description of human behavior. Following the literature on bounded rationality
we assume that workers use adaptive learning mechanisms and base their forecasts on time series
data. Thus workers in our model behave as economic statisticians and update their beliefs over
time as new data becomes available.
In the previous sections we already assumed that workers use a linear expectation operator
φ(y, w0) = αy+(1−α)w0 in order to form their forecasts. In this section we continue the analysis
by acknowledging that the best linear unbiased estimator of α can be obtained from the OLS
regression. Statistical data is generated by means of the agent-based simulation. Let wit denote
the current wage of worker i in time period t, with yit being the corresponding productivity
and wit−1 being the previous wage of the worker. We regress net wage changes wit − wit−1 on
net productivity changes yit − wit−1 restricting the sample to workers who found a new job or
changed the employer voluntarily, so that wit − wit−1 > 0:
wit − wit−1 = α(yit − wit−1) + εit
Note that we restrict the intercept of the regression to be zero for economic reasons since we
know that wit − wit−1 = 0 if yit − wit−1 = 0. If this restriction is correct than the restricted
OLS estimator is unbiased. Furthermore, we consider a setting where all workers have access to
aggregate statistical information announced by the statistical office/agency. This statistical office
collects empirical data on wages wit and productivities yit of all workers in the economy. The
expectation coefficient α is updated in every period in time, so we use notation αt, and released to
workers. It is convenient to think that there exists a statistical authority in the economy which
is collecting administrative data and informing workers about aggregate statistical variables.
But it is not relevant for our analysis whether empirical data is used directly by every worker
or collected and transmitted by the statistical authority. What is important is that all workers
in the economy have access to the same statistical information, which leads to the homogeneity
of workers’ beliefs. The statistical office minimizes the sum of squared errors over all workers
i = 1..n and all periods of time τ = 0..t− 1 using a recursive OLS mechanism:
min
αt
t−1∑
τ=1
n∑
i=1
2iτ where iτ = wiτ − wiτ−1 − αt(yiτ − wiτ−1)
Note again that the sample is restricted to workers who found a new job or changed the employer
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voluntarily, so that wiτ −wiτ−1 > 0. The estimated accumulated coefficient αˆt can be obtained
as follows:
αˆt =
∑t−1
τ=1
∑n
i=1(wiτ − wiτ−1)(yiτ − wiτ−1)∑t−1
τ=1
∑n
i=1(yiτ − wiτ−1)2
One can see that the expectation coefficient is recursively determined based on all past realiza-
tions. The starting point α0 is an exogenous initial value. This mechanism of beliefs updating
is illustrated schematically on figure 6. This figure shows that the estimated OLS coefficient αˆt
is based on past information available up to this period. Workers use this coefficient to form
expectations about their future wages E[wit+1] = αˆtyit+1 + (1− αˆt)wit. This is a specific linear
form of the theoretical expectation operator φ(y, w0). Those workers who are matched with
new sufficiently productive employers, use their expectations when bargaining over the wage
wit+1. The actual bargained wage can be higher (wit+1 > E[wit+1]) or lower (wit+1 < E[wit+1])
than the expected wage. In period t + 1 the statistical office collects full data on wages and
productivities and uses this information to update the estimated OLS coefficient αˆt+1.
E[wit+1]
αˆt ˆαt+1 Collect data and update
wit+1 Actual bargaining wage
yit
wit
yit+1
λ
t t+ 1
periods
Figure 6: Statistical updating of the expectation parameter α
The rest of the simulation refers to workers’ transitions between unemployment and jobs.
Here we closely follow the mechanism of our analytical model implemented in discrete time.
Specifically, in each period t + 1, workers and firms match randomly with probability λ and
decide whether they start working together or not. When a worker i and a firm match, they
draw a joint productivity level yit+1 from Q(y) productivity distribution randomly. The actual
wage wit+1 is bargained between the two as long as the productivity level yit+1 is higher than
the worker’s current wage wit. They produce output yit+1 in any period afterwords until the job
is destroyed (which happens with probability δ) or the worker quits the job. We use equation
(9) to determine the wage.
In Figure 7, workers’ actions and transitions are illustrated as a decision tree and the status
of the ith worker at time period t is denoted by Sit. Workers can be either unemployed or
employed, and the corresponding status index Sit is 0 and 1 respectively. Unemployed and
employed workers receive job offers at the same exogenous rate λ. While unemployed workers
will accept the job offer immediately, employed workers will accept it if the joint productivity
level of the new match is higher than the worker’s current wage. If so, the worker makes a job-
to-job transition. In contrast, when worker’s productivity in the new match is smaller than the
current wage, the worker will remain at his/her current job. The pseudo-code of the simulation
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is provided in the appendix.
Sit
0 1
Remains unemployed
Become employed
Layoff
No new job offer
Remains at current job Change the job
No layoff
1− λ λ δ 1− δ
1− λ
ωit ≥ yit+1 ωit < yit+1
λ
Receives a new job offer
Figure 7: Workers’ transitions
4.2 Numerical results
In this section we present our numerical results for the mechanism of statistical learning. We
consider an economy consisting of n = 100 workers and simulate the economy over T = 250 time
periods. The key parameters are λ = 0.45, δ = 0.05 and γ = 1 as before. We consider two initial
expectation coefficients α0 = 0.5 and α0 = 0.75 to investigate the impact of initial conditions.
One remaining parameter to be determined is the bargaining power β. Following Petrongolo
and Pissarides (2001) and Pissarides (2009) we focus on the case β = 0.5, but we also consider
a smaller (β = 0.4) and a larger (β = 0.6) value of the bargaining power. This gives rise to
6 different scenarios depending on α0 and β. Although workers are homogeneous in terms of
their expectation formation, they become heterogeneous over time with respect to their wages
and productivities starting from identical initial conditions. We simulate the model 10 times in
each scenario with different seeds of the random number generator in order to account for the
non-deterministic features of the model.
Next we describe our results. Consider first scenarios 1A and 1B where the bargaining power
β is equal to 0.4 but there are different starting values for α0. Figure 8 presents 10 different
paths of the estimated expectation coefficient αˆrt . One path corresponds to one simulation run
r. The left panel refers to scenario 1A with the initial value α0 = 0.5. The right panel illustrates
scenario 1B with α0 = 0.75. Further, we calculated average values of αˆ
r
t (
∑
r αˆ
r
t/10) over 10 runs
in each scenario. We can see that in the first scenario the average expectation coefficient quickly
converges to the value 0.584. In the second scenario 1B the average expectation coefficient
converges to 0.586, however, their difference is not statistically significant. Based on this result
we conclude that there is no persistent bias associated with the starting value α0 and calculate
an average α¯t =
∑
r αˆ
r
t/20 over 20 runs, which is equal to 0.585. We call this scenario 1. This
average is illustrated on the left panel of figure 10, bottom curve.
Next we repeat our analysis for scenarios 2 and 3 where the bargaining power is β = 0.5 and
β = 0.6 respectively. 20 paths of the estimated coefficient αˆrt are presented in figure 9, while the
corresponding average values α¯t over 20 runs are again illustrated on figure 10. All three scenarios
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Figure 8: Convergence: β = 0.4
reveal the same pattern: the estimated expectation coefficient α¯t is relatively high in the first
100 time periods but as time passes workers update their estimates and it gradually converges
to the steady state value. The process of convergence builds on the fact that agents’ current
expectations affect the actual outcomes, and the actual outcomes affect their expectations in
the next period. Thus if many workers underestimated their actual wages and were positively
surprised, the expectation is revised upward in the next period. The opposite is true when many
workers overestimated their actual wages and were disappointed by the bargaining outcome.
In the steady state the sum of squared errors is minimized, so that there is only a minimal
updating of expectations. Note that the outcomes in the steady state are ”self-confirming” in
the sense that the data that people see lead people to take actions that reproduce the data they
see (Rotemberg (2017)). Figure 10 reveals that already after 100 time periods all three curves
flatten out.
The right panel of this figure shows average wages for each scenario, which we calculated as:
w¯t =
∑
r w¯
r
t /20, where w¯
r
t is the average wage of employed workers in run r and time period t.
We can see a similar pattern with the average wages flattening out after period 100. For a more
rigorous statistical conclusion we regressed average wages w¯t on a time trend over restricted
time periods {t¯..250} with t¯ taking values {0, 50, 100, 115...160}. The slope coefficients from
regression w¯t = µ0 + µt + εt are presented in table 9 in the appendix. Initially the time trend
is significantly positive in all three scenarios but already for t¯ = 100 it becomes insignificant
in scenarios 1 and 2. It takes about 150 time periods in scenario 3. The fact that the time
trend becomes smaller and insignificant in all three scenarios reflects convergence to the steady
state. In the following analysis we only use the last 150 time periods for estimating average
values of endogenous variables in the steady state. The average expectation coefficient for every
scenario is then calculated as α¯ =
∑
t α¯t/150. These average values are summarized in table
1. The corresponding standard deviations of means over 20 runs are reported in parentheses.
Following Evans and Honkapohka (2001) we refer to this steady state as a Restricted Perceptions
Equilibrium since workers use recursive OLS learning and correctly perceive the correlation
between productivities and wages (α) without fully understanding the actual bargaining process.
Moreover, in the equilibrium there is consistency between the workers beliefs and the actual
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outcomes meaning that α = α¯(α).
Figure 9: Convergence: β = 0.5 and β = 0.6
Table 1 shows that the estimated expectation coefficient α¯ is increasing with the bargaining
power β. For example, in the second scenario when β = 0.5 the estimated α¯-coefficient is equal
to 0.6508. In the third scenario when β = 0.6 the estimated α¯-coefficient is equal to 0.7195.
This pattern reveals an important property of the model. The gap between the bargaining power
parameter β and the estimated slope parameter α¯ in the wage regression are moving closer to
each other with a higher bargaining power. This trend is very intuitive, since a full bargaining
power of workers β = 1 would be associated with α¯ = 1. This is the case when workers receive
wages equal to their productivity, so the previous wage w0 doesn’t have any impact on the
negotiation outcome. Hence an increasing pattern of α¯ with the bargaining power reflects a
diminishing role of the worker’s outside option.
Figure 10: Left panel: Average values of α¯t over 20 runs. Right panel: average wages w¯t over
20 runs
In the next step, we analyze the quality of workers’ forecasts in the model. For this purpose
we plotted predicted and actual wages on figures 11-12 taking realizations from the last period
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Initial Values
Bargaining power
β = 0.4 β = 0.5 β = 0.6
α0 = 0.5 0.5844 0.6509 0.7194
(10 runs) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
α0 = 0.75 0.5861 0.6507 0.7196
(10 runs) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
(20 runs) 0.5853 0.6508 0.7195
(0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
Table 1: Average convergence coefficient: γ = 1
t = 250 in all 20 runs. These figures reveal that workers make small forecasting mistakes when
bargaining with low productivity employers (yit − wit−1 < 1) but their forecasting precision is
worse when the net productivity of the new match is substantially larger than 1. For example,
on the left panel of figure 11, we can see a worker in a match with the net productivity equal
to yit −wit−1 = 7. This worker expected a net wage gain equal to E[wit]−wit−1 = 4.09 but the
actual net wage was well below the expectation (wit−wit−1 = 3.53). At this point it is important
to note that the probability of being in a match with the net productivity gain equal to or larger
than yit − wit−1 = 7 is extremely low given that match qualities are distributed according to
the exponential distribution 1 − e−γy and γ = 1. For example, if we take some unemployed
worker with wit−1 = 0, this probability is equal to 0.1%. This means that low productivity
realizations are much more frequent than high productivities, so the slope of the linear wage
regression converges to the point α¯ where there is a high quality of forecasting for the majority
of workers in low productivity jobs, while rare productivity outliers are less important.
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Figure 11: Left panel: Linear regression for β = 0.4. Right panel: Linear regression for β = 0.5
In addition, table 2 shows OLS estimation of wages in the last period t = 250. Even
though 100 workers in 20 runs produce 2000 data points, wage regressions are only based on
workers changing jobs and moving up the wage ladder. This leaves us with 237-292 observations
depending on the exact scenario. We can see that the overall goodness-of-fit measured by the
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R2-coefficient is very high. The reason is that even though the actual wage curve is convex in the
productivity y, it is close to being flat and has low curvature for our parameter values (see figure
5). More important is the observation that the quality of forecasting is improving with a higher
bargaining power β. The reason is that the higher bargaining power always leads to higher wages,
but the productivity distribution is the same in all three scenarios, so the average bargaining
surplus is smaller in the scenarios with a higher bargaining power, which makes it easier to
forecast wages. Finally, in all three scenarios we estimated one restricted (without the intercept)
and one unrestricted regression. We can see that the intercepts are significantly different from
zero from a statistical perspective, but they are small in absolute terms and decreasing with the
bargaining power. At the same time the estimated slope coefficients in restricted regressions
in table 2 (which are based only on the data from period t = 250) are remarkably close to the
average estimates in table 1 (based on pooled data from periods t = 101...250). This confirms
once more the result that our simulation reaches an equilibrium after t = 100. The right panel on
figure 12 compares the three regression lines across scenarios and shows that the slope coefficient
of the wage regression is increasing with the bargaining power.
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Figure 12: Left panel: Linear regression for β = 0.6. Right panel: Predicted wage differences
comparison
Variable β = 0.4 β = 0.5 β = 0.6
Unrestr. Restr. Unrestr. Restr. Unrestr. Restr.
Slope 0.587 0.585 0.654 0.653 0.712 0.710
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Intercept -0.004 -0.003 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Nr. of obs. 292 292 290 290 237 237
R2 0.987 0.988 0.994 0.994 0.997 0.997
Table 2: OLS wage regressions for different scenarios
4.3 Unemployment rates and wage distributions
In this section we analyze the macroeconomic properties of the model. Our specific focus is
on the equilibrium unemployment and wage inequality among workers. Since our model is
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implemented in the partial equilibrium framework both transition rates δ and λ are exogenous.
Moreover, unemployed workers never reject job offers in our setting. So the outflow of workers
from unemployment is equal to λu and the inflow is given by δ(1 − u). Thus the steady state
unemployment rate is equal to δ/(δ+λ). Our choice of parameters δ = 0.1 and λ = 0.45 implies
that the unemployment rate is equal to 10%. Table 3 shows the calculated average unemployment
rates in all simulation scenarios. These numbers are based on the average unemployment rate
in the last 150 periods of every run. In all scenarios the steady state unemployment rate is not
statistically different from 10%.
Initial Values
Bargaining power
β = 0.4 β = 0.5 β = 0.6
α0 = 0.5 0.0985 0.1012 0.0988
(10 runs) (0.0055*) (0.0049*) (0.0051*)
α0 = 0.75 0.10 0.1006 0.0986
(10 runs) (0.0046*) (0.0041*) (0.0049*)
(20 runs) 0.0995 0.1009 0.0987
(0.0049*) (0.0044*) (0.0049*)
Significance level: * p < 0.05
Table 3: Unemployment rate : u = 0.1 is theoretical value
Next we turn to the characterization of the equilibrium wage distributions. Empirical evi-
dence shows that typical wage distributions are hump-shaped and positively skewed (Neal and
Rosen (2000), Mortensen (2003); Christensen et al (2005)). First, we consider the limiting case
of the wage distribution when β = 1. This is a standard model of on-the-job search based on
the framework developed in Burdett-Mortensen (1998). It is the case when workers obtain their
productivity, fully foresee their future wages and there are no inefficient transitions. According
to Burdett and Mortensen (1998) the equilibrium wage distribution in this case is given by:
g(w) =
δ(δ + λ)q(w)
(δ + λ(1−Q(w)))2 where q(w) = γe
−γ(w−z) and Q(w) = 1− e−γ(w−z)
When productivity realizations have the exponential distribution, we can show that g(w) is
hump-shaped with a unique mode on the distribution support. On the one hand, productivity
realizations have a decreasing exponential density with most realizations in the left part of
the distribution. On the other hand, workers climb the wage/productivity ladder by changing
employers. However, climbing the ladder becomes more difficult the higher the wage of the
worker, since productivity realizations above the current wage become more and more scarce.
Thus the majority of workers climbs quickly to the middle range of the wage distribution where
the speed of climbing slows down. This explains the hump-shape of the equilibrium wage density.
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The unique mode of the distribution can be obtained as:
q′(w)(δ + λ(1−Q(w))) = −2λq2(w)
Inserting q(w) and Q(w) corresponding to the exponential distribution we find that the mode
is equal to wM = − 1γ ln δλ . With the benchmark parameters described above we get wM = 2.19.
So the theoretical wage density in the limiting case when β = 1 has a unique maximum at 2.19.
Next we derive the average wage (z = 0):
δ(δ + λ)
∫ ∞
0
wγe−γw
(δ + λe−γw)2
dw =
δ + λ
γλ
[ln (δ + λ)− ln δ]
For our parameter values the average wage is equal to 2.5584. The fact that the mean is larger
than the mode is a first indication for the positive skewness of the density. Indeed, the skewness
of the distribution is equal to 0.82 (with the standard deviation σ = 1.5). This shows that the
theoretical wage density when β = 1 is unimodal and positively skewed. What can we say about
the equilibrium wage distributions in the other cases when the bargaining power is less than 1?
The corresponding wage histograms from period t = 250 over 20 runs are illustrated on
figures 13-14. The average wages over the last 150 periods and 20 runs are calculated as w¯ =∑
t w¯t/150 and summarized in table 4. In all three scenarios we approximate the empirical wage
distributions with a Gaussian kernel density function. The three densities and the analytical
wage distribution for β = 1 are plotted and compared on the right panel of figure 14.
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Figure 13: Wage histogram and density: Left panel: β = 0.4, σ = 1.06, s = 0.39. Right panel:
β = 0.5, σ = 1.13, s = 0.43
We can see that the average wage is gradually increasing with the bargaining power from
1.8261 when β = 0.4, to 1.9456 when β = 0.5 and finally it is 2.0632 for β = 0.6. This was
already illustrated on figure 10. In addition, we know that the upper bound for the average
wage is equal to 2.5584 when β = 1. The wage density is shifting to the right as the workers’
bargaining power is increasing and approaching the analytical wage distribution g(w) in the
limit. Moreover, the dispersion of the wage distribution is also increasing indicating higher wage
inequality. For example, the standard deviation σ is equal to 1.06 when β = 0.4, it is 1.13
when β = 0.5 and 1.19 in the third scenario when β = 0.6. Recall that in the limiting case of
β = 1 the standard deviation is equal to 1.5. This highlights the fact that a higher individual
bargaining power of workers is associated with higher wage inequality in our model. At the same
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Figure 14: Left panel: Wage histogram and density for β = 0.6, σ = 1.19, s = 0.52. Right panel:
Comparison, statistics for the analytical wage density σ = 1.50, s = 0.82
time the skewness of the distribution is also increasing indicating that the right tail of the wage
distribution is spreading to the right and getting longer. This effect can also be observed on
the corresponding wage histograms. Whereas the highest simulated wage in the first scenario is
equal to 6.48, it is already 7.67 in the third scenario when β = 0.6. Overall, we can conclude that
the simulated wage distributions are unimodal and positively skewed inline with the empirical
evidence. Furthermore, wage dispersion and the skewness of the distribution are both increasing
with the individual bargaining power of workers.
Initial Values
Bargaining power
β = 0.4 β = 0.5 β = 0.6
α0 = 0.5 1.8349 1.9348 2.0694
(10 runs) (0.042) (0.064) (0.065)
α0 = 0.75 1.8174 1.9563 2.0569
(10 runs) (0.042) (0.038) (0.040)
(20 runs) 1.8261 1.9456 2.0632
(0.050) (0.051) (0.052)
Table 4: Average wages: γ = 1
In the next step we investigate the link between the bargaining power β and the incidence of
job-to-job transitions. Since employed workers only consider their personal wage improvements
when moving between jobs, job-to-job transitions can be either efficient or inefficient. The job-
to-job transition is efficient if the newly matched firm’s productivity level is higher than that of
the current employer of the worker, otherwise it is inefficient (recall figure 2). Consider first the
limiting case when β = 1. The measure of employees earning wage w is given by eg(w), where
e = λ/(δ + λ) is the employment rate. These workers are matched with a new employer at rate
λ. With probability (1 − Q(w)) the productivity of the new match is higher than the current
wage of the worker w which leads to the job change. So the measure of workers employed at
wage w and moving up in the wage ladder is eg(w)λ(1−Q(w)). Integrating over all workers and
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dividing by the total employment e we get the average fraction of employees changing the job.
The exponential distribution of productivities yields the following result:∫ ∞
0
g(w)λ(1−Q(w))dw = λδ(δ + λ)γ
∫ ∞
0
e−2γw
(δ + λe−γw)2
dw =
δ
λ
(δ + λ)[ln (δ + λ)− ln (δ)]− δ
With our parameter values this gives a fraction of employees changing jobs equal to 7.8%. It is
remarkable that this fraction is independent of parameter γ, that is the shape of the productivity
distribution Q(y) is irrelevant for the fraction of job-to-job movers. The same result is illustrated
in Hornstein et al. (2011) (equation 15). In fact they show that the fraction of job-to-job movers
as well as the ratio between the mean wage and the (non-zero) reservation wage are the same in
the Burdett and Mortensen (1998) framework irrespective of the distribution Q(y).
From an empirical perspective Hornstein et al. (2011) report that the average monthly job-
to-job flow in the United States varies between 2.2% and 3.2% of employment. This is equivalent
to quarterly numbers between 6.6% and 9.6%. These numbers are similar to the outcome of our
simulation presented in table 5. When β = 0.4, the average fraction of employees moving to
better paid jobs is equal to 11.17%. It is decreasing with a higher bargaining power and equal
to 10.44% when β = 0.5. Further, it falls down to 9.64% in the third scenario. We already know
that in the limiting case β = 1 the lower bound for the fraction of job-to-job movers is 7.8%.
Initial Values
Bargaining power
β = 0.4 β = 0.5 β = 0.6
α0 = 0.5 0.1119 0.1051 0.0971
(10 runs) (0.0038) (0.0033) (0.0035)
α0 = 0.75 0.1114 0.1037 0.0957
(10 runs) (0.0035) (0.0019) (0.0027)
(20 runs) 0.1117 0.1044 0.0964
(0.0036) (0.0026) (0.0031)
Table 5: Workers’ job-to-job transitions: γ = 1
At this point it is important to emphasize that not all job-to-job transitions of workers
are efficient. To the best of our knowledge there is only one other study that addressed the
problem of inefficient transitions in the setting with on-the-job search, this is Flinn et al. (2017).
In their model there are two types of firms: one group of firms is always renegotiating wages
whenever their workers get an outside offer, another group of firms makes a take-it-or-leave-it
wage offer and never renegotiates. Due to the presence of these two firm types it happens that
the worker employed in the non-negotiating firm is matched with a less productive bargaining
employer, negotiates a higher wage and makes the move. However, Flinn et al. (2017) stress
the point that inefficient transitions exist only if both types of firms coexist in the market. Our
model is based on the assumption that firms bargain over the wage in the beginning of the
employment relationship but don’t renegotiate if the worker gets an outside offer. Due to this
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feature inefficient transitions arise in the market when all firms are of the same type and follow
the same wage strategy.
Table 6 shows the average number of inefficient transitions expressed as a fraction of all
transitions. In the first scenario when the bargaining power is low (β = 0.4), 28.29% of all
transitions are inefficient but this fraction is decreasing with the bargaining power down to
23.35% when β = 0.5 and 19.89% in the third scenario. In the limiting case when β = 1 all
transitions are efficient since wages are equal to the marginal productivities and workers only
make the move if their wage is higher with the new employer. This pattern is intuitive. If the
bargaining power of workers is low, bargained wages are well below the marginal productivity of
the employer, so there is a high probability of 28.29% that the worker will be matched with a new
employer who’s productivity is above the current wage of the worker but below the productivity
of the current employer. As the bargaining power is increasing the gap between wages and
productivities is closing and the probability of inefficient transitions is decreasing.
Initial Values
Bargaining power
β = 0.4 β = 0.5 β = 0.6
α0 = 0.5 0.2867 0.2340 0.2003
(10 runs) (0.009) (0.015) (0.010)
α0 = 0.75 0.2792 0.2331 0.1975
(10 runs) (0.011) (0.012) (0.007)
(20 runs) 0.2829 0.2335 0.1989
(0.010) (0.013) (0.008)
Table 6: Workers’ inefficient transitions: γ = 1
Summarizing the results of this section we can see that a higher individual bargaining power
of workers is associated with higher wage inequality in our model. This trend is observed
despite the fact that the overall mobility of workers and the fraction of inefficient transitions are
decreasing with a higher bargaining power.
4.4 Robustness check
In this section we analyze the role of the productivity distribution Q(y) in shaping the market.
So far we used an exponential distribution Q(y) = 1 − e−γy with parameter γ = 1. In our
model workers form their expectations by using aggregate data on wages. This means if low
productivity matches are very frequent, the sample contains many workers employed at low
productivities and low wages. This statistical data may produce pessimistic wage expectations.
However, if high productivity matches are very frequent, then the statistical sample will contain
many observations with high productivities and high wages. This may lead to more optimistic
expectations. This means that, on the one hand, the shape of the productivity distribution
could bias the expectations of workers in the steady-state. On the other hand, Hornstein et
al. (2011) show that the wage-ladder model of Burdett-Mortensen has a number of properties,
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for which the distribution of wage offers/productivities is irrelevant. One such feature we have
already highlighted in the previous section, namely the fact that the fraction of job-to-job movers
doesn’t depend on parameter γ. So it is apriori not clear if γ has an impact on the expectation
coefficient α or not.
In order to answer this question we performed additional simulations with a higher value of γ
equal to 2. The average productivity of new matches in this case is equal to 0.5, which is two times
lower compared to the benchmark model. Also the productivity threshold y∗ = (k+λ)/λγ is two
times lower and equal to 0.565. At the same time we can see that this shift of the distribution
doesn’t lead to the relative changes. For example, the fraction of new matches with productivity
below the mean is again P{y < 1γ } = 1 − e−γ/γ = 0.63 and the fraction of productivity draws
below y∗ remains the same: P{y < y∗} = 1 − e−γy∗ = 1 − e−(k+λ)/λ = 0.68. For the purpose
of this section we restrict our analysis only to the first two scenarios with β = 0.4 and β = 0.5
and the starting value α0 = 0.5. Table 7 shows the average expectation coefficient α¯ and the
average wages based on the last 150 observations of every run. As expected the average wages
are roughly two times smaller compared to the reference case γ = 1. The corresponding wage
histograms and kernel densities are illustrated on figure 15.
Variable
Bargaining power
Variable
Bargaining power
β = 0.4 β = 0.5 β = 0.4 β = 0.5
Average α¯ 0.5856 0.6500 Average wage 0.9099 0.9726
(0.003) (0.001) (0.020) (0.014)
Table 7: Values of endogenous variables in the steady state when γ = 2, α0 = 0.5, 10 runs
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Figure 15: γ = 2. Left panel: Wage histogram and density for β = 0.4. Right panel: β = 0.5
Most important is the result that the average expectation coefficient α¯ doesn’t change upon
the γ-shift of the productivity distribution. Table 7 shows that α¯ is equal to 0.585 for β = 0.4
and it is 0.650 for β = 0.5. These numbers coincide with the reference case reported in table 1.
Thus the shape of the distribution doesn’t effect the expectations of workers and our results are
invariant to γ-shifts of the productivity distribution. Figure 16 shows all the runs with γ = 2 in
the first two scenarios.
In order to understand this result we have calculated the fraction of job-to-job transitions
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Figure 16: Left panel: γ = 2 and β = 0.4. Right panel: γ = 2 and β = 0.5
and the fraction of inefficient transitions summarized in table 8. We can see that all fractions are
similar to those in the reference case. This shows that the shift of the productivity distribution
is a nominal change for the model, which is not associated with relative changes, such as the
fraction of workers moving between jobs and the fraction of inefficient transitions among them.
Also the fraction of workers with productivities below the mean and below the productivity
threshold y∗ doesn’t change. Altogether this leads to the fact that the expectation coefficient α
is also neutral with respect to the γ-shifts of the productivity distribution. The question whether
a more substantial change of the productivity density going beyond the exponential assumption
remains for future research.
Variable
Bargaining power
Variable
Bargaining power
β = 0.4 β = 0.5 β = 0.4 β = 0.5
Inefficient transitions 0.2710 0.2356 Job-to-job transitions 0.1129 0.1038
(0.012) (0.010) (0.0036) (0.0028)
Table 8: Steady-state transitions when γ = 2, α0 = 0.5, 10 runs
5 Conclusion
In this paper we develop a search and matching model with heterogeneous firms, on-the-job
search, Nash bargaining and simple linear learning mechanism. Workers are homogeneous and
seek better paid jobs while they are unemployed or employed. In particular, we consider bound-
edly rational workers and model the bargaining process as a ”black box” meaning that workers
have limited foresight and can not perfectly predict the outcome of wage bargaining. Workers
in our model behave as economic statisticians and update their beliefs over time as new data
becomes available. Specifically, we assume that workers use OLS learning mechanisms and base
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their forecasts on the estimated linear wage regression with the firm’s productivity and worker’s
current wage as regressors. For a restricted set of parameters, we show analytically that the
bargaining solution in this setting is unique. We embed this solution into the agent-based sim-
ulation which allows us to provide a numerical characterization of the Restricted Perceptions
Equilibrium. We use the simulation to record workers’ transitions across employers, as well as
their wages and productivities. This empirical data is used to estimate the coefficient of the wage
regression reflecting an empirical correlation between wages and productivities. We find that the
estimated coefficients converge to the steady state values and workers do not make systematic
errors on average. So workers’ beliefs and the actual outcomes are consistent in the equilibrium.
The estimated coefficient on productivity is always higher than the bargaining power parameter,
but the difference between the two is decreasing with the bargaining power and vanishes when
workers are paid their full productivity. This is the limiting case when workers’ expectations are
rational. The overall quality of forecasting is very high and increasing in the bargaining power.
Further, we can show that the average wage in the steady-state is increasing in the bargaining
power of workers and there is a gradual shift towards the analytical wage distribution in the
limiting case when workers are paid their full productivity. At the same time wages become
more dispersed and the positive skewness of the wage distribution becomes stronger with a
higher bargaining power. One of the most important properties of our model is that it allows
to evaluate the extent of inefficient transitions. Our results indicate that a higher bargaining
power of workers is associated with a lower overall frequency of job-to-job transitions and a
lower fraction of inefficient transitions among them. This sheds some light on the lower job-
to-job mobility of workers in countries with strong unionization, like France and Germany and
more intensive job-to-job mobility in the US and UK reported in Jolivet et al. (2006). Finally,
we show that our results are robust to the shifts of the productivity distribution. In particular,
we find that the coefficients of the linear regression used in shaping workers expectations do not
change if the average productivity of firms is increased or reduced.
6 Appendix
Appendix I
rW (w) = w + λ
∫ y¯
w
(W (φ(y, w))−W (w))dQ(y)− δ(W (w)− U)
= w + λ(W (φ(y, w))−W (w))Q(y)
∣∣∣y¯
w
− λ
∫ y¯
w
Q(y)W ′(φ(y, w))φ′y(y, w)dy − δ(W (w)− U)(11)
= w + λ(W (φ(y¯, w))−W (w))− λ
∫ y¯
w
Q(y)W ′(φ(y, w))φ′y(y, w)dy − δ(W (w)− U)
= w + λ
∫ φ(y¯,w)
w
W ′(x)dx− λ
∫ φ(y¯,w)
w
Q(φ−1(x,w))W ′(x)dx− δ(W (w)− U)
= w + λ
∫ φ(y¯,w)
w
[1−Q(φ−1(x,w))]W ′(x)dx− δ(W (w)− U)
rW ′(w) = 1− λ(1−Q(w))W ′(w) + λ(1−Q(y¯))W ′(φ(y¯, w))φ′(y¯, w)
− λ
∫ φ(y¯,w)
w
q(φ−1(x,w))
∂φ−1(x,w)
∂w
W ′(x)dx− δW ′(w)
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Given that Q(y¯) = 1 we get:
(r + δ + λ(1−Q(w)))W ′(w) = 1− λ
∫ φ(y¯,w)
w
q(φ−1(x,w))
∂φ−1(x,w)
∂w
W ′(x)dx
Proof of proposition 1.
W (w) = (keγ(w−z) + λ)
1−α
α
∫ w
z
(α− γ(1− α)x)
α(k + λe−γ(x−z))
(keγ(x−z) + λ)−
(1−α)
α dx
− (keγ(w−z) + λ) 1−αα γ(1− α)δU
α
∫ w
z
eγ(x−z)(keγ(x−z) + λ)−
1
α dx+ (keγ(w−z) + λ)
1−α
α C
= A(w) +
δU
k
(keγ(w−z) + λ)
1−α
α
(
(keγ(x−z) + λ)
−(1−α)
α
)
|wz + (keγ(w−z) + λ)
1−α
α C
= A(w) +
δU
k
− δU
k
(k + λ)
−(1−α)
α (keγ(w−z) + λ)
1−α
α + (keγ(w−z) + λ)
1−α
α C
= A(w) +
δ
k
C(k + λ)
1−α
α +
r
k
C(keγ(w−z) + λ)
1−α
α
where in the last equation we use that U = (k+λ)
1−α
α C. Differentiating W (w) with respect to w we get:
W ′(w) = A′(w) + rCγeγ(w−z)
(1− α)
α
(keγ(w−z) + λ)
1−α
α −1 (12)
Inserting (12) into (4) we get:
kW (w) = w + λ
∫ ∞
w
e−γ
(t−(1−α)w−αz)
α
[
A′(t) + rCγeγ(t−z)
(1− α)
α
(keγ(t−z) + λ)
1−α
α −1
]
dt+ δU
= w + δU + λ
∫ ∞
w
e−γ
(t−(1−α)w−αz)
α A′(t)dt− rCeγ (1−α)(w−z)α
(
(k + λe−γ(t−z))
1−α
α
)
|∞w
= w + δU + λ
∫ ∞
w
e−γ
(t−(1−α)w−αz)
α A′(t)dt− rCeγ (1−α)(w−z)α
(
k
1−α
α − (k + λe−γ(w−z)) 1−αα
)
Evaluating this equation at w = z and using that U = (k + λ)
1−α
α C we get the following equation for C:
kW (z) = z + δC(k + λ)
(1−α)
α + λ
∫ ∞
z
e−γ
(t−z)
α A′(t)dt− rC
(
k
1−α
α − (k + λ) 1−αα
)
= kC(k + λ)
(1−α)
α
So the integration constant C is given by:
rk
1−α
α C = z + λ
∫ ∞
z
e−γ
(t−z)
α A′(t)dt
Appendix II:
Proof of proposition 2, part a. If α = 0.5 and z = 0 auxiliary function A(w) can be written as:
A(w) = (keγw + λ)
∫ w
0
(1− γx)(keγx + λ)−1
(k + λe−γx)
dx = (keγw + λ)
∫ w
0
(1− γx)eγx
(keγx + λ)2
dx
= (keγw + λ)
[
− 1
γk(keγx + λ)
+
ln (keγx + λ)
γλk
− xe
γx
λ(keγx + λ)
]
|w0
= (keγw + λ)
[
− 1
γk(keγw + λ)
+
ln (keγw + λ)
γλk
− we
γw
λ(keγw + λ)
+
1
γk(k + λ)
− ln (k + λ)
γλk
]
= (keγw + λ)
[ eγw − 1
γ(k + λ)(keγw + λ)
+
ln (keγw + λ)− ln (k + λ)
γλk
− we
γw
λ(keγw + λ)
]
=
eγw − 1
γ(k + λ)
+ (keγw + λ)
[ln (keγw + λ)− ln (k + λ)]
γλk
− we
γw
λ
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A′(w) =
eγw
k + λ
+
eγw
λ
[ln (keγw + λ)− ln (k + λ)]− wγe
γw
λ
rkC = λ
∫ ∞
0
e−2γwA′(w)dw = λ
∫ ∞
0
[ e−γw
k + λ
+
e−γw
λ
[ln (keγw + λ)− ln (k + λ)]− wγe
−γw
λ
]
dw
= λ
(
− e
−γw
γ(k + λ)
+
e−γw ln (k + λ)
γλ
− e
−γw ln (k + λe−γw)
γλ
− k ln (k + λe
−γw)
γλ2
+
e−γw
γλ
)
|∞0
= λ
(
−k ln (k)
γλ2
+
1
γ(k + λ)
− ln (k + λ)
γλ
+
ln (k + λ)
γλ
+
k ln (k + λ)
γλ2
− 1
γλ
)
= −k ln (k)
γλ
+
λ
γ(k + λ)
+
k ln (k + λ)
γλ
− 1
γ
=
k(ln (k + λ)− ln (k))
γλ
− k
γ(k + λ)
rC =
1
γ
[ (ln (k + λ)− ln (k))
λ
− 1
(k + λ)
]
W (w) = A(w) +
δ
k
C(k + λ) +
r
k
C(keγw + λ)
=
eγw − 1
γ(k + λ)
+ (keγw + λ)
[ln (keγw + λ)− ln (k + λ)]
γλk
− we
γw
λ
+
δ
k
C(k + λ) +
r
k
C(keγw + λ)
Insert C into the last term to obtain:
W (w) =
eγw − 1
γ(k + λ)
+ (keγw + λ)
[ln (keγw + λ)− ln (k + λ)]
γλk
− we
γw
λ
+
δ
k
C(k + λ)
+
(keγw + λ)
kγ
[ (ln (k + λ)− ln (k))
λ
− 1
(k + λ)
]
=
eγw − 1
γ(k + λ)
+ (keγw + λ)
ln (keγw + λ)
γλk
− we
γw
λ
+
δ
k
C(k + λ)− (ke
γw + λ) ln (k)
kγλ
− (ke
γw + λ)
kγ(k + λ)
=
−1
γ(k + λ)
+ (keγw + λ)
ln (keγw + λ)
γλk
− we
γw
λ
+
δ
k
C(k + λ)− (ke
γw + λ) ln (k)
kγλ
− λ
kγ(k + λ)
= − 1
kγ
(1 + ln k) +
δ
k
(k + λ)C +
(keγw + λ)
γλk
ln (keγw + λ)− we
γw
λ
− e
γw ln (k)
γλ
kW (w) = w + δ(k + λ)C +
(keγw + λ)[ln (k + λe−γw)− ln k]
γλ
− 1
γ
kW ′(w) =
k
λ
eγw[ln (k + λe−γw)− ln (k)] = k
λ
eγw ln
(
1 +
λ
k
e−γw
)
> 0
The second order derivative of W (w) with respect to w becomes:
W ′′(w) =
1
λ
[
eγwγ ln(1 +
λ
k
e−γw) + eγw
1
(1 + λk e
−γw)
λ
k
e−γw(−γ)
]
=
γ
λ
[
eγw ln(1 +
λ
k
e−γw)− λ
k
1
(1 + λk e
−γw)
]
> 0
To obtain the result that W ′′(w) > 0 denote the term keγw/λ = ω > 0, so kW ′′(ω) becomes:
W ′′(ω) =
γ
k
ω
[
ln(1 +
1
ω
)− 1
ω(1 + 1ω )
]
=
γω
k
[
(ω + 1) ln(1 + 1ω )− 1
]
(ω + 1)
> 0
As shown in the proof of proposition 2, part b, the function (ω+1) ln (1 + 1ω ) is monotonically decreasing
in ω and converging to 1 from above, so that (ω + 1) ln (1 + 1ω ) > 1. Thus W
′′(w) > 0.
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Proof of proposition 2, part b. If α = 1/3 and z = 0 function A(w) can be written as:
A(w) = (keγw + λ)2
∫ w
0
(1− 2γx)(keγx + λ)−2
(k + λe−γx)
dx = (keγw + λ)2
∫ w
0
(1− 2γx)eγx
(keγx + λ)3
dx
=
w
k
+
(keγw + λ)2 ln (k + λe−γw)
γλ2k
− (ke
γw + λ)
γλk
− 1
2γk
− (keγw + λ)2
[ ln (k + λ)
γλ2k
− 1
γλk(k + λ)
− 1
2γk(k + λ)2
]
A′(w) =
1
k
+
2(keγw + λ)eγw ln (k + λe−γw)
λ2
− (ke
γw + λ)2e−γw
(k + λe−γw)λk
− e
γw
λ
− 2kγeγw(keγw + λ)
[ ln (k + λ)
γλ2k
− 1
γλk(k + λ)
− 1
2γk(k + λ)2
]
=
2(keγw + λ)eγw[ln (k + λe−γw)− ln (k + λ)]
λ2
− 2e
γw
λ
+ 2eγw(keγw + λ)
[ 1
λ(k + λ)
+
1
2(k + λ)2
]
rk2C = λ
∫ ∞
0
e−3γwA′(w)dw =
k2
γλ
[ ln (k + λ)− ln k
λ
− 1
k + λ
− λ
2(k + λ)2
]
W (w) = A(w) +
δ
k
C(k + λ)2 +
r
k
C(keγw + λ)2
=
w
k
+
(keγw + λ)2 ln (k + λe−γw)
γλ2k
− (ke
γw + λ)
γλk
− 1
2γk
− (keγw + λ)2
[ ln (k + λ)
γλ2k
− 1
γλk(k + λ)
− 1
2γk(k + λ)2
]
+
δ
k
C(k + λ)2
+
r
rkγλ
(keγw + λ)2
[ ln (k + λ)− ln k
λ
− 1
k + λ
− λ
2(k + λ)2
]
=
w
k
+
(keγw + λ)2[ln (k + λe−γw)− ln k]
γλ2k
− (ke
γw + λ)
γλk
− 1
2γk
+
δ
k
C(k + λ)2
kW ′(w) = 1 +
2keγw
λ2
(keγw + λ)[ln (k + λe−γw)− ln k]− (ke
γw + λ)2
λ(keγw + λ)
− ke
γw
λ
=
2keγw
λ2
(keγw + λ)[ln (k + λe−γw)− ln k]− 2ke
γw
λ
=
2keγw
λ
[(k
λ
eγw + 1
)
ln
(
1 +
λ
k
e−γw
)− 1] > 0
To obtain the result that W ′(w) > 0 denote the term keγw/λ = ω > 0, so kW ′(ω) becomes:
kW ′(ω) = 2ω[(ω + 1) ln (1 +
1
ω
)− 1]
Differentiate the term (ω + 1) ln (1 + 1ω ) with respect to ω:
ln (1 +
1
ω
)− (ω + 1)ω
ω2(ω + 1)
= ln (1 +
1
ω
)− 1
ω
< 0
This means that (ω + 1) ln (1 + 1ω ) is monotonically decreasing in ω. Next consider the limit for ω →∞:
lim
ω→∞(ω + 1) ln (1 +
1
ω
) = lim
ω→∞
ln (1 + 1ω )
1
1+ω
= lim
ω→∞
ω(1 + ω)2
ω2(1 + ω)
= lim
ω→∞
1 + ω
ω
= 1
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This shows that function (ω + 1) ln (1 + 1ω ) is monotonically decreasing in ω and converging to 1 from
above, so that (ω + 1) ln (1 + 1ω ) > 1 and W
′(w) > 0.
The second order derivative of W (w) with respect to w becomes:
kW ′′(w) =
2keγw
λ
γ
[(k
λ
eγw + 1) ln
(
1 +
λ
k
e−γw
)− 1]
+
2keγw
λ
[keγwγ
λ
ln
(
1 +
λ
k
e−γw
)
+
(k
λ
eγw + 1
) 1(
1 + λk e
−γw) λk e−γw(−γ)]
Using the same notation the term keγw/λ = ω > 0, so kW ′′(ω) becomes:
kW ′′(ω) = 2ωγ
[
(1 + ω) ln(1 +
1
ω
)− 1
]
+ 2ωγ
[
ω ln(1 +
1
ω
)− 1
]
= 2ωγ
[
(1 + 2ω) ln(1 +
1
ω
)− 2
]
Differentiate the term (1 + 2ω) ln(1 + 1ω ) with respect to ω:
2 ln(1 +
1
ω
) + (1 + 2ω)
1
(1 + 1ω )
(− 1
ω2
) = 2 ln(1 +
1
ω
)− (1 + 2ω)
(ω2 + ω)
< 0
To prove this inequality differentiate the term 2 ln(1 + 1ω )− (1+2ω)(ω2+ω) with respect to ω:
2
(1 + 1ω )
(− 1
ω2
)−
[2(ω2 + ω)− (1 + 2ω)(2ω + 1))
(ω2 + ω)2
]
= − 2
(ω2 + ω)
+
2ω2 + 2ω + 1
(ω2 + ω)2
=
1
(ω2 + ω)2
> 0
This means the term 2 ln(1+ 1ω )− (1+2ω)(ω2+ω) is monotonically increasing in ω. It is clear that limω→∞ 2 ln(1+
1
ω )− (1+2ω)(ω2+ω) = 0. Thus the term (1 + 2ω) ln(1 + 1ω ) is monotonically decreasing in ω. Next consider the
limit for ω →∞:
lim
ω→∞(1 + 2ω) ln(1 +
1
ω
) = lim
ω→∞
ln(1 + 1ω )
1
1+2ω
= lim
ω→∞
1
ω2+ω
2
(2ω+1)2
= lim
ω→∞
(2ω + 1)2
2(ω2 + ω)
= 2
This shows that function 2 ln(1 + 1ω )− (1+2ω)(ω2+ω) is monotonically decreasing in ω and converging to 2 from
above, so that 2 ln(1 + 1ω )− (1+2ω)(ω2+ω) > 2 and W ′′(w) > 0.
Proof of proposition 2, part c. If α = 1/4 we get the following differential equation:
W ′(w) =
1− 3γ(w + δU)
k + λe−γw
+
3γk
k + λe−γw
W (w)
The general solution of this equation is given by:
kW (w) = δU − (ke
γw + λ)2
γλ2
− ke
γw + λ
2γλ
+
(keγw + λ)3[γw + ln(k + λe−γw)− ln(k)]
γλ3
(13)
− we
3γwk3
λ3
− 3we
2γwk2
λ2
− 3we
γwk
λ
− 1
3γ
Using that W (0) = U , we find the present value of unemployment U from the above equation:
rU
(k + λ)3
= rC =
1
γλ2
[ [ln(k + λ)− ln(k)]
λ
− 1
k + λ
− λ
2(k + λ)2
− λ
2
3(k + λ)3
]
In order to find a value function note that:
(keγw + λ)3w
λ3
=
we3γwk3
λ3
+
3we2γwk2
λ2
+
w3eγwk
λ
+ w
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The first three terms cancel out in equation (13), so the value function W (w) can be written as:
kW (w) = w + δU +
(keγw + λ)3[ln(k + λe−γw)− ln(k)]
γλ3
− (ke
γw + λ)2
γλ2
− ke
γw + λ
2γλ
− 1
3γ
Next we differentiate W (w) with respect to w:
kW ′(w) = 1 +
3(keγw + λ)2[ln(k + λe−γw)− ln(k)]keγw
λ3
− (ke
γw + λ)3
(keγw + λ)λ2
− 2(ke
γw + λ)keγw
λ2
− ke
γw
2λ
= 1 +
3( kλe
γw + 1)2[ln(1 + λk e
−γw)]keγw
λ
− (k
2e2γw + 2keγwλ+ λ2)
λ2
− 2k
2e2γw + 2λkeγw
λ2
− ke
γw
2λ
= 3(ω + 1)2[ln(1 +
1
ω
)]ω − 9
2
ω − 3ω2 = 3ω
(
(ω + 1)2[ln(1 +
1
ω
)]− ω − 1.5
)
where ω = kλe
γw as before. Next we determine the sign of function Ω(w) = (ω + 1)2[ln(1 + 1ω )]− ω
Ω′(w) = 2(ω + 1) ln(1 +
1
ω
)− 2− 1
ω
with lim
w→∞Ω
′(w) = 0
Ω′′(w) = 2 ln(1 +
1
ω
)− 2
ω
+
1
ω2
with lim
w→∞Ω
′′(w) = 0
Ω′′′(w) = − 2
(ω + 1)ω
+
2
ω2
− 2
ω3
= − 2
(ω + 1)ω3
< 0
This means that Ω′′(ω) is a monotonically decreasing function converging to 0 from above, which implies
that Ω′′(ω) > 0 ∀ω > 0. At the same time this means that Ω′(ω) is a monotonically increasing function
converging to 0 from below, so that Ω′(ω) < 0 ∀ω > 0. This proves that Ω(ω) is a decreasing function.
Moreover, defining t = 1/ω one can show that:
lim
ω→∞Ω(ω) = limω→∞(ω + 1)
2[ln(1 +
1
ω
)]− ω = lim
t→0
(
1
t
+ 1)2[ln(1 + t)]− 1
t
= lim
t→0
(1 + t)2[ln(1 + t)]− t
t2
= lim
t→0
2(1 + t)[ln(1 + t)] + t+ 1− 1
2t
= lim
t→0
2[ln(1 + t)] + 2 + 1
2
= 1.5
where in the second line we used the L’Hopital rule. This proves that Ω(ω)−1.5 > 0, so that W ′(w) > 0.
Next let’s consider the second order derivative of W (w) with respect to w:
kW ′′(w) = 3
∂ω
∂w
(
(ω + 1)2[ln(1 +
1
ω
)]− ω − 1.5 + ω2(ω + 1)[ln(1 + 1
ω
)]− (ω + 1)− ω
)
= 3γω
(
(3ω2 + 4ω + 1)[ln(1 +
1
ω
)]− 3ω − 2.5
)
= 3γω
(
(ω + 1)(3ω + 1)[ln(1 +
1
ω
)]− 3ω − 2.5
)
where ω = kλe
γw as before. Next we define the function Φ(ω) = (ω + 1)(3ω + 1) ln(1 + 1ω ) − 3ω and
prove that Φ(ω) > 2.5 ∀ω > 0.
Φ′(w) = (6ω + 4) ln(1 +
1
ω
)− 6− 1
ω
with lim
w→∞Φ
′(w) = 0
Φ′′(w) = 6 ln(1 +
1
ω
)− 6ω + 4
ω(ω + 1)
+
1
ω2
= 6 ln(1 +
1
ω
)− 6ω
2 + 3ω − 1
ω2(ω + 1)
with lim
w→∞Φ
′′(w) = 0
Φ′′′(w) =
6
(1 + 1ω )
(− 1
ω2
)− ω[(12ω + 3)ω(ω + 1)− (6ω
2 + 3ω − 1)(3ω + 2)]
ω4(ω + 1)2
=
= − 6
ω(ω + 1)
− [12ω
3 + 12ω2 + 3ω2 + 3ω − 18ω3 − 12ω2 − 9ω2 − 6ω + 3ω + 2]
ω3(ω + 1)2
=
= − 6
ω(ω + 1)
− [−6ω
3 − 6ω2 + 2]
ω3(ω + 1)2
= − 2
ω3(ω + 1)2
< 0
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This means that Φ′′(ω) is a monotonically decreasing function converging to 0 from above, which implies
that Φ′′(ω) > 0 ∀ω > 0. At the same time this means that Φ′(ω) is a monotonically increasing function
converging to 0 from below, so that Φ′(ω) < 0 ∀ω > 0. This proves that Φ(ω) is a decreasing function.
Moreover, one can show that:
lim
ω→∞Φ(ω) = limω→∞(ω + 1)(3ω + 1) ln(1 +
1
ω
)− 3ω = lim
t→0
(
1
t
+ 1)(
3
t
+ 1)[ln(1 + t)]− 3
t
=
= lim
t→0
(t2 + 4t+ 3)[ln(1 + t)]− 3t
t2
= lim
t→0
2(t+ 2)[ln(1 + t)] + t+ 1 + 2− 3
2t
= lim
t→0
2[ln(1 + t)] + 2 + 21+t + 1
2
= 2.5
which proves that Φ(ω)− 2.5 > 0, so that W ′′(w) > 0 ∀w > 0.
If α = 1 and z = 0 auxiliary function A(w) can be written as:
A(w) =
∫ w
0
dx
(k + λe−γx)
A′(w) =
1
(k + λe−γw)
rC = λ
∫ ∞
0
e−γw
(k + λe−γw)
dw = − 1
γ
∫ ∞
0
dλe−γw
(k + λe−γw)
= − 1
γ
ln(k + λe−γw)
∣∣∣∞
w=0
= − 1
γ
(ln k − ln(k + λ)) = 1
γ
(ln(k + λ)− ln k)
W (w) =
∫ w
0
1
(k + λe−γx)
dx+ C =
∫ w
0
eγx
(keγx + γ)
dx+ C
=
1
kγ
∫ w
0
dkeγx
(keγx + λ)
+ C =
1
kγ
ln(keγx + λ)
∣∣∣w
0
+ C
=
ln(keγw + λ)− ln(k + λ)
kγ
+ C =
ln(keγw + λ)
kγ
− ln(k + λ)
kγ
+ C
Taking derivative of W (w) with respect to w we can obtain:
W ′(w) =
eγw
(keγw + λ)
> 0 W ′′(w) =
γeγw(keγw + λ)− kγe2γw
(keγw + λ)2
=
γλeγw
(keγw + λ)2
> 0
Hence the present value of being employed is an increasing and convex function of w. Note that the value
function W (w) can be rewritten in the spirit of proposition 2 (since k − r = δ):
kW (w) =
ln(keγw + λ)
γ
− ln(k + λ)
γ
+
k
rγ
(ln(k + λ)− ln k)
= w +
[ln (k + λe−γw)− ln k]
γ
− r[ln(k + λ)− ln k]
rγ
+
k
rγ
(ln(k + λ)− ln k)
= w +
[ln (k + λe−γw)− ln k]
γ
+ δC where rC =
1
γ
(ln(k + λ)− ln k)
Appendix III: proof of lemma 2.
J ′′(y, w) =
[(−1)λ(−γ)e−γ(w−z)) + (−1)λγe−γ(w−z) + (y − w)λγe−γ(w−z)(−γ)](k + λe−γ(w−z))2
(k + λe−γ(w−z))4
− [(−1)(k + λe
−γ(w−z)) + (y − w)λγe−γ(w−z)]2(k + λe−γ(w−z))λ(−γ)e−γ(w−z)
(k + λe−γ(w−z))4
= − (y − w)λγ
2e−γ(w−z)
(k + λe−γ(w−z))2
+
[(y − w)λγe−γ(w−z) − (k + λe−γ(w−z))]2λγe−γ(w−z)
(k + λe−γ(w−z))3
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J ′′(y, w) = − (y − w)λγ
2e−γ(w−z)
(k + λe−γ(w−z))2
+
2λγe−γ(w−z)J ′(y, w)
(k + λe−γ(w−z))
< 0 holds for w > w∗(y)
Proof of lemma 4.
First, we introduce two auxiliary variables:
L(w,w0) ≡ 1
kγ
[ln(keγw + λ)− ln(keγw0 + λ)] and N(y, w) ≡ (y − w)λγe−γw − (k + λe−γw)
Note that L(w,w0) = (W (w)−W (w0)) > 0 and N(y, w) = J ′w(y, w)(k + λe−γw)2 < 0, because we know
that J ′w(y, w) < 0 for any valid solution. So the first order condition (10) can be rewritten as:
β(y − w) = −(1− β)L(w,w0)N(y, w)
Next, we implicitly differentiate this equation with respect to w and y and rearrange the terms:
β(1− ∂w
∂y
) = −(1− β)L′wN
∂w
∂y
− (1− β)L
[
N ′y +N
′
w
∂w
∂y
]
∂w
∂y
[
β − (1− β)L′wN − (1− β)LN ′w
]
= β + (1− β)LN ′y
Note that N ′y = λγe
−γw > 0, so the right-hand side of this equation is positive. To obtain the sign of the
square bracket we differentiate L and N with respect to w:
L′w =
eγw
(keγw + λ)
> 0 N ′w = −λγe−γw − (y − w)λγ2e−γw + λγe−γw = −(y − w)λγ2e−γw < 0
Given that N < 0 and L > 0, the square bracket is positive, which proves that ∂w/∂y > 0. Next we
implicitly differentiate with respect to w and w0:
−β ∂w
∂w0
= −(1− β)
[
L′w
∂w
∂w0
+ L′w0
]
N − (1− β)LN ′w
∂w
∂w0
Rearranging terms we get:
∂w
∂w0
[
β − (1− β)L′wN − (1− β)LN ′w
]
= (1− β)L′w0N
We already know that the term in the square bracket is positive, so we need the sign of L′w0 :
L′w0 = −
eγw0
keγw0 + λ
< 0
Given that N < 0 for a valid solution, we can see that the right-hand side of this equation is positive,
which proves that ∂w/∂w0 > 0.
A Pseudo-code of the simulation
Initialization
1. Initializing the parameter values and variables of the model
2. Creating n workers and initializing their individual variables (productivities, statuses, wages and tran-
sitions of the workers)
3. Creating n firms and initializing their productivities which are randomly drawn from the fixed expo-
nential distribution
Sequence of the events
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4. While t < T ( T is the total number of periods of the run): computing value functions for workers
using the expectation parameter ˆαt−1 and profit functions for firms: Wit and Jit
5. Workers and firms match randomly
5.1 Unemployed workers receive job offers at job finding rate λ and accept job offers, since unemployment
benefit z equals to zero
a) The worker i and the firm i bargain over the wage: wit
b) The worker’s status index is updated to Sit = 1
c) The transition index is updated to Nit =1
d) Worker’s productivity level becomes the joint productivity of the worker and the firm: pit = yit
5.2.1 When current job of the employed worker i is destroyed at probability δ:
e) The worker’s wage becomes zero wit = 0
f) The worker’s status index is changed to Sit = 0
g) The worker’s transition index is changed to Nit = 0
h) The worker’s productivity level becomes zero pit = 0
5.2.2 When current job of the employed worker i is not destroyed at probability (1− δ):
1. Employed workers do not receive job offers at probability (1− λ):
All individual variables remain unchanged: wit = wit−1, Nit = 0, Sit = 1, pit = pit−1
2. Employed workers receive job offers at job finding rate λ:
Case 1: The employed worker accepts the new job offer if the joint productivity level with the new firms
is higher than the workers’ current wage
l) The worker i and the firm i bargain over the wage wit
m) The transition index is updated to Nit = 1
n) The worker’s productivity level becomes the joint productivity of the workers and the firm: pit = yit
Case 2: If the new firm’s productivity is lower than the workers’ current wage then the worker stays at
the current job and individual variables remain unchanged: wit = wi,t−1, Nit = 0, Sit = 1, pit = pit−1
6. The expectation parameter αˆt is updated:
a) αˆt =
∑t−1
k=1
∑n
i=1(ωik−ωik−1)(yik−ωik−1)∑t−1
k=1
∑n
i=1(yik−ωik−1)2
if ∃i such that Nit = 1
b) αˆt = ˆαt−1 if for all i Nit = 0
7. Computing unemployment and employment rates: ut, et.
Time trend t ≥ 0 t ≥ 50 t ≥ 100 t ≥ 115 t ≥ 130 t ≥ 145 t ≥ 160
Coefficient
β = 0.4 0.00147∗ 0.00018∗ 0.00016∗ 0.00010 0.00003 0.00000 −0.00009
β = 0.5 0.00137∗ 0.00005 0.00017∗ 0.00005 0.00005 0.00009 −0.00034
β = 0.6 0.00155∗ 0.00019∗ 0.00035∗ 0.00026∗ 0.00046∗ 0.00057∗ 0.00010
* – significance level 0.1%
Table 9: Regression of the average wage w¯t on time trend t, slope coefficients
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